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Bart Peeters* & Lars Vanneste**
This contribution critically assesses the complex hybrid mismatch rule concerning financial instruments as developed under the OECD BEPS action
2-proposal and subsequently implemented in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD). Both approaches are compared, starting with a profound
analysis of the OECD initiative. Given their obligation to implement the European initiative in domestic tax law by 1 January 2020, domestic
legislators now have to deal with the exact meaning of the Directive. However, the ambiguous text incites uncertainties and will definitely raise
incoherencies between the several EU-Member States.
Both international initiatives clearly rather aim to counter tax avoidance, instead of creating coherencies: only double non-taxation is
envisaged and the taxpayer is confronted with a rather technical, hierarchical set of rules increasing his tax burden, because of an objective
incoherent outcome. The solution is hardly inspired by the fundamental idea of BEPS to tax income where it has been generated. Given this
rather mechanical approach the question is finally raised whether restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital
can be justified. However, as this article focuses on the task for domestic legislators, this ultimate question has not been substantially
investigated.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1. In addition to the classical forms of financial
instruments (equity, debt, etc.), hybrid financial
instruments have become very important in the last
decades. They are increasingly used to reduce the glo-
bal tax burden especially in the context of international
tax optimization. Particular arrangements exploit dif-
ferences in the tax treatment of financing instruments
or value transfers between two or more countries. They
often lead to a non-intended ‘double non-taxation’ or
may alternatively defer a tax debt which, if maintained
over several years, is economically similar to double
non-taxation.1 These types of arrangements can be
considered as forming a component of the more general
concept of ‘aggressive tax planning’. Because several
different definitions do exist,2 we prefer to use this
term as a vague concept focusing on behaviour in
general that might be challenged by national legisla-
tors as conflicting with their tax policies.
2. The role played by hybrid mismatch arrange-
ments in aggressive tax planning has been discussed
in several OECD reports. Even before the outcome of
the BEPS Action Plan in 2010, the OECD recom-
mended revenue bodies to ‘bring to the attention
those situations where the same tax loss is relieved
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1 See OECD, Hybrid mismatch Arrangements – Tax Policy and Compliance Issues 5 (OECD Publishing 5 Mar. 2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/HYBRIDS_ENG_Final_
October2012.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019); OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2–2015 Final Report 11 (OECD Publishing 5 Oct. 2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/neutralising-the-effects-of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-action-2-2015-final-report-9789264241138-en.htm (accessed 14 Oct. 2019) (hereafter:
OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report).
2 E.g. J. M. Calderon Carrero & A. Quintas Seara, The Concept of ‘Aggressive Tax Planning’ Launched by the OECD and the EU Commission in the BEPS Era: Redefining the Border
Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Tax Planning, 44(3) Intertax 210 (2016): Calderon Carrero & Quintas Seara refer to ‘a new tax policy guiding principle that helps to define
the paradigm shift and the new way of understanding international taxation based on a supranational level, but without ruling out possible applications through the
interpretation of the new approach that will guide all international (and national) regulations adopted in the “post-BEPS era”’; A. P. Dourado, Aggressive Tax Planning in EU
Law and in the Light of BEPS: the EC Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning and BEPS Actions 2 and 6, 43(1) Intertax 44 (2015): According to Dourado the concept
aggressive tax planning is ‘an umbrella concept to both international tax planning and tax Avoidance to define the concept of aggressive tax planning’; P. H. J. Essers,
International Tax Justice Between Machiavelli and Habermas, 68(2) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 57 (2014): Essers states that it is ‘a very vague concept which blurs the fundamental
differences between legal tax planning, tax avoidance and tax fraud’. The tax administrations may use aggressive tax planning in a Machiavellian sense.
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in more than one country as a result of differences in
tax treatment between jurisdictions, in order to
determine whether steps should be taken to elimi-
nate that arbitrage/mismatch opportunity’.3 In
2011, it recommended to consider introducing
restrictions on ‘the multiple deduction of the same
economic loss through the use of hybrid
mismatches’.4 A 2012 report5 finally summarizes
tax policy issues that are raised by hybrid mismatch
arrangements and describes the policy options in
domestic tax law to address them.6 When launching
the BEPS Action Plan, international mismatches in
relationship to the classification of entities and finan-
cial instruments were recognized as one of the most
important key pressure areas that can potentially
lead to (unintended7) double non-taxation or long-
term tax deferral.8
The issue has finally been taken up under OECD
BEPS Action 2.9 The final BEPS Action 2 Report
provides several recommendations from both domes-
tic and treaty perspectives to tackle the unintended
outcome of double non-taxation caused by hybrid
mismatches as will be further explained in this
contribution.
3. The OECD recommendations have also been
applied on a European level by the European
Commission: as a response to the BEPS Action Plan,
the European Commission adopted an ‘Action Plan for
a Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation’ in June
2015.10 This was further adapted in an Anti-Tax
Avoidance Package of 28 January 201611 containing
measures to prevent aggressive tax planning, encourage
tax transparency, and create a level playing field for all
businesses in the EU. A key element in this package
was the proposal for an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
(ATAD), containing six measures that all Member
States should apply against common forms of aggres-
sive tax planning. Five of them were ultimately with-
held in the accepted Council Directive (EU) 2016/
1164 (ATAD I).12 One provision, Article 9, also
focused on addressing hybrid mismatches between
EU Member States; however, the work on them was
only partially completed. The Council on economic
and financial affairs (ECOFIN) Council issued a state-
ment on 12 July 2016 requesting the Commission to
introduce a proposal on hybrid mismatches involving
third countries in order to provide for rules (consistent
with and no less effective than the rules) recommended
by the OECD BEPS Report on Action 2 with the
intention of reaching an agreement by the end of
2016.13 After agreement between the Member States
on 21 February 2017, the Commission’s proposal of 25
October 2016 led to the adoption of the ATAD II that
reformed the ATAD I with regard to hybrid mis-
matches on 29 May 2017.14
4. This contribution will provide a critical com-
prehensive analysis of the complex hybrid mis-
matches rules concerning financial instruments.
Notes
3 OECD, Addressing Tax Risks Involving Bank Losses 10 (OECD Publishing 15 Sept. 2010), www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/46023583.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
4 OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation Through Aggressive Tax Planning 57 (OECD Publishing 11 Aug. 2011),www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/corporatelossutilisa
tionthroughaggressivetaxplanning.htm (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
5 OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, supra n. 1.
6 For example, harmonization of domestic laws, general anti-avoidance rules, specific anti-avoidance rules, and rules specifically addressing hybrid mismatch arrangements.
7 In margin nr. 8, we will reveal that the mere double non-taxation is envisaged as an objective situation to be combatted. This implies that the mere outcome of double non-
taxation is unintended without any subjective aim of the taxpayer having to be taken into account.
8 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 10 (OECD Publishing 12 Feb. 2013), http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-
9789264192744-en.htm. The OECD calls for the development of ‘instruments to put an end to or neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements and arbitrage’.
9 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1.
10 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas
for Action, COM(2015) 302 final, 1–15 (17 June 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/fairer_corpo
rate_taxation/com_2015_302_en.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019). The European Commission also had previously taken autonomous initiatives: see European Commission,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion, COM(2012) 722 final, 1–
16 (6 Dec. 2012), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/com_2012_722_en.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019);
European Commission, Summary Report of the Responses Received o the Public Consultation on Factual Examples and Possible Ways to Tackle Double Non-Taxation Cases (5 July 2012),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/consultations-get-involved/tax-consultations/factual-examples-possible-ways-tackle-double-nontaxation-cases_en (accessed 14 Oct.
2019).
11 European Commission, Anti Tax Avoidance Package (28 Jan. 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/anti_tax_avoidance/index_en.htm (accessed
14 Oct. 2019).
12 Council Directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying down Rules against Tax Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, OJ L 193/1,
1–14 (19 July 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L1164 (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
13 See EU Council, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries, (FISC) 206, nr. 2, 1 (28 Nov. 2016),
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14819-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019); See also A. Rigaut, Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (2016/1164): New EU
Policy Horizons, 56(11) Eur. Tax’n 497 (2016).
14 Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, OJ L 144/1 1–11 (7 June 2017),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0952 (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
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Challenging the compatibility of ATAD with the
OECD initiative, we will illuminate the differences
between both approaches and identify risks of con-
flicting domestic implementations caused by
remaining uncertainties of this hybrid financial
instrument rule. As EU-Member States had to trans-
pose the provisions of the hybrid financial instru-
ment rule by 31 December 2019 and apply them per
1 January 202015, 2019 was the year that domestic
legislators had to confront existing domestic rules
with these requirements.
Before beginning our analysis, we will first deline-
ate the precise scope of these rules. It remains
remarkable that, although they focus on mis-
matches in domestic legislation, creating coherence
is not the genuine goal of these rules. They rather
aim to combat perceived abuses that the taxpayer,
being confronted with incoherent legal systems, is
blamed for.
2 HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT RULE AS
AN ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE MEASURE
5. The precise scope of the hybrid financial instru-
ment rule leaves several ambiguities: a ‘hybrid finan-
cial instrument’ is not inherently defined, only tax
reducing effects appear to be envisaged, and the mere
obtaining of a benefit does not necessarily reflect the
intent of a concerned taxpayer to actively avoid paying
taxes. These three general aspects will be further
explained before focusing on the technical constraints
themselves.
6. Although definitions exist for a ‘financial
instrument’,16 a ‘hybrid financial instrument’ is not
commonly defined. It concerns an instrument that is
classified differently in the domestic law of various
countries. Classic examples of a hybrid financial
instrument are redeemable preference shares, profit
participating loans, subordinated debentures, conver-
tible debts, and perpetual debts.
The OECD seems to describe hybrid [financial]
instruments as ‘instruments which are treated differ-
ently for tax purposes in the countries involved, most
prominently as debt in one country and as equity in
another country’.17
As the definition of the OECD is rather general, a
more tangible description of the term ‘hybrid finan-
cial instrument’ would certainly be appreciated.
According to previous legal doctrine,18 there are
two approaches to identify ‘hybrid financial instru-
ments’. The ‘first approach’ contains only a reference
to specific elements of both debt and equity capital
without requiring different tax treatment. A ‘second
approach’ defines these types of instruments as a
mixture between debt and equity capital that can
result in a different tax treatment of the same instru-
ment. The various approaches prove why one gener-
ally accepted definition of the term hybrid financial
instrument is rather difficult to make. In our opi-
nion, a hybrid financial instrument should be
defined as ‘an instrument that has (economic) char-
acteristics that are inconsistent, in whole or in part,
with the legal (more specific: tax) qualification of the
instrument and hence the tax treatment of the pay-
ments under it19 that may lead to double non-taxa-
tion or double taxation’.20 Therefore, we adhere to
the second approach.
7. The OECD hybrid mismatch rule (as well as its
European successor under the ATAD) targets finan-
cial instruments whereby mismatches are typically
the result of (technical) differences in the way jur-
isdictions tax the payments under these instruments
(debt or equity) rather than because of dissimilarities
in the way that the instrument itself is legally
Notes
15 Art. 11, §5a ATAD. Under ATAD I implementation of the hybrid mismatch rules had been foreseen by 31 Dec. 2018. ATAD II extended the delay by one year. By way of
derogation, the specific reverse hybrid entity rule of Art. 9a ATAD (requiring taxation of income to the extent not otherwise taxed) would need to be transposed by 31 Dec.
2021 and applied per 1 Jan. 2022. Nonetheless, payments to reverse hybrids would no longer be deductible beginning 1 Jan. 2020. It remains remarkable to notice that this
additional delay, foreseen in Art. 2, §3 ATAD II has not been added as an amendment in the text of ATAD I.
16 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 1.2., 23 and Art. 2, §9, al. 3, j) ATAD.
17 OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangement, supra n. 1. It is mentioned that ‘hybrid mismatches mainly arise because of conflicts of qualification, from either a treaty or domestic
perspective, and even from both perspectives combined, in different jurisdictions’. In this context, the Commentaries of the OECD Model Tax Convention describe hybrid
financing as ‘some kind of hidden capitalization or hidden equity capitalization’, see OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2014 R(4)-5 (OECD Publishing 30
Oct. 2015), www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2015-full-version-9789264239081-en.htm (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
18 See C. Kahlenbergh & A. Kopec, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements – A Myth or a Problem That Still Exists?, 8(1) World Tax J. 40 (2016); E. Eberhartinger & M. A. Six, Taxation
of Cross-Border Hybrid Finance: A Legal Analysis, 37(1) Intertax 4 ff (2009); H. Doormbush & A. Kramer, The Combined Benefits of Classification, Int’l Tax Rev. 27 (1998); M.
Helminen, Classification of Cross-Border Payments on Hybrid Instruments, 58(2) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 56 (2004); D. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New
Financial Environment, 49(3) Tax L. Rev. 499 ff (1994).
19 The conflict of qualification is due to the different legal understanding of the financial instrument and the income derived therefrom as debt or equity – interest and
dividend – in different jurisdictions. The tax consequences of the characterization as debt and equity can differ substantially.
20 See also E. Jansen & E. van Kasteren, Hybrid Financial Instruments, 10(5) Derivatives & Fin. Instruments 175 (2008).
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treated under common law. More particularly, it
emphasizes that the international tax arbitrage is
because taxpayers exploit mismatches in national
tax laws regarding the treatment of flows of value
under financial instruments.21 An arrangement
seems to only be envisaged if the ‘hybrid mismatch
arrangement’ causes a double non-taxation.22 A mis-
match in tax outcomes leading towards extensive
taxation due to characterization differences is not
particularly considered. However, one of the key
pillars of the OECD BEPS Action Plan (and the
ATAD) was to introduce more coherence in the
domestic rules that affect cross-border activities.
Nonetheless, when focusing on financial instru-
ments, double taxation due to mismatches no longer
seems to be an issue to be addressed, although this
could possibly not be avoided. As such, double taxa-
tion can arise when a financial instrument is treated
as equity in the payer’s jurisdiction and as a debt
instrument in the payee’s jurisdiction; the first State
qualifies the payment as a non-deductible dividend
while the latter State considers taxable interest being
received. 23
8. The previous remark immediately reveals the last
critical aspect. The hybrid mismatch rule is intended
to counter tax avoidance24 However, the mere fact of
(corporate) taxpayers taking advantage of inconsistent
treatment does not necessarily indicate that there is
avoidance behaviour. First of all, the mere presence of
double non-taxation in transactions between related
parties already triggers the application of anti-hybrid
regulations,25 although both the OECD26 and the
EU27 state that only ‘unintended’ double non-taxation
is problematic. An objective situation is, as such,
envisaged.28 Moreover, the internal law aspects of
either domestic legal system might be fully respected
and not circumvented. From a unilateral domestic
perspective, the purpose (or intention) of the law is
not being defeated.29 It is solely the consequence of
disparities between national tax systems (the proper
allocation of the local law in cross-border situations30)
for which the taxpayer is blamed.31
3 HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS UNDER
THE BEPS ACTION 2 FINAL REPORT
3.1 General Remarks
9. First, we critically focus on the proposals of the
OECD under the Final BEPS Action 2 report.
Although its value cannot be neglected, these
OECD initiatives are ultimately ‘only’ recommenda-
tions without any legal value. Moreover, even under
the general outcome of the BEPS Action Plan, Action
2 was not considered to be an element of the accepted
minimum standards that parties agreed to implement
Notes
21 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements nr. 42, 29 (OECD Publishing 16 Sept. 2014), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/neutralising-the-effects-
of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements_9789264218819-en#page1 (accessed 14 Oct. 2019); European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/96/EU
on the Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States, COM(2013) 814 final 5 (25 Nov. 2013), http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/com/com_com(2013)0814_/com_com(2013)0814_en.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019); European Commission,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion, supra n. 10.
22 The OECD and the European Commission do not focus on the creation of coherence in general but merely on the way hybrid mismatches are exploited as a tax planning tool.
23 Kahlenbergh & Kopec, supra n. 18, at 74.
24 F. Vanistendael, Is Tax Avoidance the Same Thing Under the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan, National Tax Law and EU Law?, 70(3) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 171
(2016); See also OECD BEPS Action 2 Final report, supra n. 1, at nr. 284, p. 96: ‘Just as the hybrid mismatch rules require co-ordination with hybrid mismatch rules in other
jurisdictions they also must be co-ordinated as between themselves and with other specific anti-abuse and re-characterization rules’.
25 The OECD and the European Union do not seem to differentiate between different realities or different reasons for the outcome of double non-taxation once it is caused by a
hybrid element. In this context, one could, e.g. refer to Art. 2, §11 ATAD whereas the mere mismatch outcome is also sufficient to qualify as a ‘structured arrangement’
‘unless the taxpayer or an associated enterprise could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of the hybrid mismatch’.
26 It is considered that ‘the same concern that exists in relation to distortions caused by double taxation exists in relation to unintended double non-taxation’. See OECD, Hybrid
Mismatch Arrangements, supra n. 1.
27 In this context, see also Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Tax Policy in the European
Union – Priorities for the Years Ahead, COM(2001) 260 final, OJ C 284/6 (10 Oct. 2001), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/164839 (accessed 14 Oct. 2019): The EU-
Commission considered that ‘certainly, further coordination of national tax systems in the area of company taxation would help to eliminate situations of double taxation or
unintentional non-taxation.’
28 This is also stressed by F. D. Martinez Laguna, Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning: Between OECD and EU Initiatives – The Dividing Line Between Intended and Unintended Double
Non-Taxation, 9(2) World Tax J. 224 (2017); L. De Broe, At Last, Some Output on the Fight Against Double Non-Taxation, 23(6) EC Tax Rev. 309–311 (2014).
29 See Martinez Laguna, supra n. 28: Martinez Laguna states that it is ‘not possible to attribute intentions in hybrid situations in the abstract; It is not possible to link
unintended double non-taxation and hybrid mismatches’. The sovereignty of countries and the lack of coordination makes it extremely difficult to determine whether and if
so which domestic tax system has willingly not been respected.
30 In this case, it is relevant which domestic situations might lead to double non-taxation across borders and the role of intentions when two or more States are involved.
31 The OECD BEPS Action 2 report states that ‘it is often difficult to determine unequivocally which individual country has lost tax revenue under the arrangement’, see OECD
BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 2, at 15. See also European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Against Tax Avoidance Practices that
Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, COM(2016) 26 final 3 (28 Jan. 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
52016PC0026&from=EN (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
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in any case. Non-obligatory proposals to change tax
treaties have been integrated into Articles 3 to 5 of
the Multilateral Instrument,32 and the BEPS Action 2
proposals for domestic tax law are also not binding.33
The value of Article 9 ATAD is clearly different.
The European integration of these recommendations
in a directive made their implementation obligatory
for the EU Member States. However, since the
ATAD is based on the OECD proposals, we first
begin with the OECD framework.
10. BEPS Action 2 has a broad scope regarding dif-
ferent types of hybrid constellations. In 2017, the final
2015 report was even further complemented with an
additional report about branch mismatch
arrangements.34 However, only hybrid financial instru-
ments, as previously described, will be further addressed.
Therefore, neither the additional 2017 report nor other
aspects proposed for in the 2015 report will be discussed.
This study is limited to the recommendations for the
domestic law treatment of hybrid financial instruments.
3.2 Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule
11. The general philosophy of BEPS Action 2 departs
from an expected tax outcome.35 Hybrid financial
instruments can lead to a so-called (direct) D/NI36 out-
come under which a payment is deducted in a payer
jurisdiction but is not supposed to be included in the
taxable income in the payee jurisdiction due to the
hybrid mismatch. This outcome is combatted through
a hierarchy of solutions referred to as ‘linking rules’. The
primary rule denies the deduction for a payment under a
financial instrument by the payer jurisdiction to the
extent it generates a D/NI outcome.37 The (secondary)
defensive rule requires such a payment to be included in
ordinary income to the extent that the payment pro-
duces a D/NI outcome, and the deduction is not refused
in the payer jurisdiction (Figure 1).38
Figure 1.
12. This rather direct set of rules is further comple-
mented in the case of a third State financing the
creation of this hybrid payment between two States
that have not provided for any of the recommended
rules. In this case, the third State is considered to have
imported the mismatch and will refuse a deduction of
a (regular) payment in as far as this has been set off
against an expenditure under a hybrid mismatch
arrangement (imported mismatch) (Figure 2).39
13. In addition to the linking rules (and the
imported mismatch rule), the OECD BEPS Action 2
Report also provides specific recommendations for the
domestic tax treatment of financial instruments.40
Notes
32 These concern the right of a residence State to tax its own residents, the exclusion of dual residents from the scope of tax conventions unless a mutual agreement between tax
administrations is concluded, and three options to adapt the obligation to provide relief in the case of mismatches. States always maintain the option of not integrating these
proposals. (Cf. Art. 4, §3, a); 11, §3, a) and Art. 5, §8 MLI.)
33 Although not the subject of this contribution, it is relevant to notice that the hybrid financial instrument rule is clearly of significant interest to developed countries. See also
R. S. Collier & N. Riedel, The OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative and Developing Countries, 72(12) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 709 (2018). According to Collier and
Riedel, the hybrid mismatch rules are often concerned with the effects of highly structured tax planning i.e. not seen regularly in the context of developing countries. As
such, BEPS Action 2 has not been identified as a high priority for the developing countries. For more details regarding this topic, cf. OECD, Two-Part Report to G20
Developing Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries 1–72 (OECD Publishing, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/report-to-g20-dwg-on-the-
impact-of-beps-in-low-income-countries.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019). However, the two-tiered approach with linking rules as well as the additional imported mismatch rule
offer possibilities to react against the (ab)use of mismatches with financial instruments if a developing country was involved (Cf. margin nrs. 51 ff).
34 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1.
35 In this way, the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report does not need to address the characterization of the instrument itself. It merely reconciles the expected tax consequences of
hybrid instruments. The hybrid mismatch rule links rules that seek to align the tax treatment of an instrument with the tax outcome in the counterparty jurisdiction ‘but
[which] otherwise do not disturb the tax or commercial outcomes’, see OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 11.
36 Abbreviation for ‘Deduction/Non-Inclusion’.
37 This implicitly covers a prior solution in the payee jurisdiction. The non-inclusion in this State can come from the qualification of the received payment as a dividend i.e.
exempted from taxation. However, this exemption is sometimes submitted to the condition of the income not being deductible in the payer State. If, because of a deduction
in the payer State, the payment is no longer exempted in the payee State, no mismatch arises, and no rules have to be applied. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra
n. 1, Recommendation 2, at 45 ff.
38 This order immediately reflects a difference with the EU initiative. As the directive is binding upon the Member States, they will have to implement the primary rule.
Therefore, the secondary rule will only become a factor when third countries are concerned.
39 See B. Peeters, Imported Mismatches, in The Implementation of Anti-BEPS Rules in the EU: A Comprehensive Study 437–451 (P. Pistone & D. Weber ed., IBFD 2018); C. Allen, The
Difficult Imported Mismatch Rules: BEPS Action 2 Recommendations, 19 Derivatives & Fin. Instruments 6 (2017).
40 The purpose is to prevent mismatches from arising by seeking to bring the treatment of the instruments into accordance with the tax policy outcomes that will generally
apply to the same instruments in the domestic context. A payment under a hybrid financial instrument will not be treated as generating a D/NI outcome if the mismatch
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These recommendations suggest (1) that jurisdictions
that offer an exemption for dividends41 do not extend
that exemption to deductible payments42 and (2) that
jurisdictions granting relief for tax withheld at its
source on a payment made under a hybrid transfer
should restrict the benefit of such relief in proportion
to the net taxable income of the taxpayer under the
arrangement.43 These measures, to a certain extent,
reduce the relevance of the linking rules and the
imported mismatch rules. Moreover, the scope of
these (additional) recommendations is not limited to
transactions between related parties and parties to
structured arrangements. This differs from the general,
and further analysed, hybrid financial instrument mis-
match rule.
3.3 Scope of the Rule
14. The hybrid financial instrument rule applies to a
‘payment’ (and a substitute payment) between ‘related
parties’ or under a ‘structured arrangement’ for a ‘finan-
cial instrument’ that results in a hybrid mismatch.
3.3.1 Personal Scope
15. The personal scope of this rule is limited to pay-
ments that are made ‘between related parties’ and pay-
ments that are made ‘under a structured arrangement
whereby the taxpayer44 is party to that structured
arrangement’. This scope once again substantiates the
focus on tax avoidance, although a relation in
Figure 2.
Notes
will be neutralized in the counterparty jurisdiction by domestic law designed to align the tax treatment of the payment with tax policy outcomes applicable to an instrument
of that nature. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 35, at 29.
41 The recommendation is limited to ‘dividend payments’. This means that, e.g. the Belgian ‘notional interest’ or the Spanish ‘capitalization reserve’ are excluded from the scope. These are
mechanisms that do not require any payment in the form of a distribution of income to give rise to such relief.The questionwas raised as towhether the Brazilian interest deduction on net
equity (the juros sobre o capital próprio) is within the scope of this recommendation. Calvo and San Salvador state that, with regard to the Brazilian interest payment, ‘the direct relationship
between a taxdeduction arising from the payment of income and non-taxation of that payment, which is the starting point for this recommendation, is questionable’. SeeR.Calvo&E. San
Salvador, Brazil/Spain Tax Treatment of JSCPs in Spain: Past, Present and Future, 57(10) Eur. Tax’n 446 (2017). However, the payment seems to meet the conditions for the application of
mismatch rules as it represents a deductible expense under Brazilian tax law and, at the same time, an exempt dividend from the perspective of the residence State.For more details
regarding this Brazilian system, seeR.Tomazela Santos,The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 2 andHybrid Financial Instruments: Countering Deduction and Non-Inclusion Schemes in Third-Country
Situation, 72(88) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 515 ff (2018); M. Loran& E. Villa,HybridMismatches and the BEPS Project: A Spanish Perspective on Brazilian Juros, 19(2)Derivatives& Fin. Instruments 1
(2017); R. Tomazela,Why Brazil’s Interest on Net Equity Should Not Be Affected by BEPS Action 2, Kluwer Int’l Tax Blog 26 (26 Aug. 2015); F. D. Martinez Laguna, Institutional Hybrid
Financial Instruments andDouble Non-taxationUnderDomestic Rules and TaxTreaty Law: The Example of Spain, 44(6/7) Intertax 447–462 (2016); S. Vanoppen,BelgiumNationalReport, inThe
Debt-Equity Conundrum, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, Volume 97b., 117–118 (IFA 2012).
42 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 2.1., at 45 ff. The dividend exemptions are adopted to avoid double taxation of distributions of after-tax
profits. However, the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report recognizes the problems that arise from the inclusion of the exemption method in tax treaties with regard to items of
income that are not taxed in the payer’s jurisdiction.
43 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 2.2., at 45 ff.
44 The OECD BEPS Action 2 Report does not explicitly state that the scope of the hybrid financial instrument rule is limited to ‘taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax’. However,
one of the key objectives of BEPS is to increase the coherence of corporate income taxation at the international level. The report further clarifies that a person established in a
jurisdiction that does not impose a corporate income tax will not be treated as a taxpayer of that jurisdiction. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, at nr. 425.
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shareholder-ship does not automatically imply avoidance
behaviour being at stake. It can be assumed that these
conditions should be fulfilled at the time the payment is
made (as the purpose of the OECD is to neutralize ‘the
mismatch of a payment’ under a financial instrument).
3.3.1.1 Related Parties
16. In general, hybrid mismatch arrangements are
within the scope of BEPS Action 2 if the parties to the
mismatch are ‘members of the same control group’, i.e.
if they form a part of the same consolidated group for
accounting purposes,45 if a provision between them can
be regarded as a provision between associated enter-
prises under Article 9 OECDModel Tax Convention,46
or if one person has a 50 % investment or effective
control over the other person (or a third person has this
control over both). The rationale for requiring a 50%
ownership threshold appeared to be related to the con-
trolling influence that is required to determine the tax
treatment at the level of hybrid entities themselves.
However, as far as hybrid financial instruments are
concerned, this scope is further extended as the
required threshold is reduced. Besides ‘members of
the same control group’ ‘related parties’ are also envi-
saged. This is considered to be the case if a person has a
25% or greater (direct or indirect) investment in
another person (or a third person holds 25% in both).
Reference is made to 25% of the voting rights47 or the
value of any equity interests48 of that person.49
17. To preserve the effectiveness of the rule and avoid
tax planning schemes, an ‘acting-together’ measure is
proposed. Persons ‘acting together’ with another person
in the capacity of ownership or control of any voting
rights or equity interests will be treated as owning or
controlling all of the voting rights and equity interests of
that other person. They are required to aggregate their
ownership interests for the purposes of the related party-
test. This prevents taxpayers from avoiding this test by
transferring their voting interest or equity interests to a
different person who continues to act under their direc-
tion in relationship to those interests.
As such, a person will also be treated as holding the
equity or voting interests of another person if both have
entered into an arrangement regarding the ownership or
control of those rights or interests. The measure encom-
passes both arrangements concerning the exercise of
voting interests (such as the right to participate in any
decision-making) as well as arrangements regarding
beneficial entitlements (such as entitlement to profits
or eligibility to participate in distributions).50
3.3.1.2 Party to a Structured Arrangement
18. Additionally, the hybrid mismatch rule also
applies to a taxpayer that is ‘a party to a structured
arrangement’. This is a typical anti-avoidance measure
aiming to capture those taxpayers that enter into
agreements51 that (a) have specifically been designed
to avoid the effect of the related party rules in order to
produce a mismatch in tax outcomes or (b) when the
hybrid mismatch is priced into the terms of the
arrangement itself. The mere mismatch outcome is
sufficient to qualify as a ‘structured arrangement’. The
fact that an arrangement produces a combination of tax
and commercial benefits does not necessarily prevent
the arrangement from being treated as structured if an
objective and well informed observer would conclude
that part of the explanation for the design of the
arrangement was to generate a hybrid mismatch.52
Notes
45 The accounting consolidation uses these principles in international financial reporting standards (IFRS) or in the applicable local generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP). For example, the IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements will treat two or more persons as being related if the subsidiary is required to be consolidated on a
line-by-line basis in the parent’s consolidated financial statements.
46 According to Art. 9 OECD Model Tax Convention, these are associations between the taxpayer and the counterparty for the purposes of transfer pricing. For transfer pricing
purposes, two enterprises are associated if one of the enterprises ‘directly or indirectly’ participates in the management, control, or capital of the other or if ‘the same persons
participate directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital’ of both enterprises (e.g. if both enterprises are under common control of a parent entity). As no
further commentary is provided, this could still lead to different interpretations of the term ‘associated enterprises’ between countries.
47 Voting rights refer to ‘the right to participate in any decision-making concerning a distribution, a change to the constitution or the appointment of a director’. According to
the OECD, the rights must be actual decision-making rights, e.g. a convertible bond holder who can elect, at any time, to convert his bonds into ordinary shares should be
treated as holding voting interests in the issuer on a diluted basis while a lender who has the right to appoint a receiver in the event of default under a loan will not be
treated as holding voting rights in the borrower. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 358, at 115.
48 Equity interest means ‘any interest in any person that includes an entitlement to an equity return’. An equity return means ‘an entitlement to profits or eligibility to
participate in distributions’. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 359, at 115.
49 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 373–374, at 118.
50 Ibid., nr. 373, at 118.
51 An arrangement will include a number of separate arrangements that are part of the same plan or understanding. It will include all of the steps and transactions by which
that plan or understanding is effectuated. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 322, at 106.
52 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 326, at 107.
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The consequence is that a marketed tax-advan-
taged product could be in scope of the hybrid finan-
cial mismatch rules even if the parties are not
related.53 A taxpayer can avoid being included in
the hybrid mismatch rule if that person (also not any
member of the same control group) could not reason-
ably have been expected to be aware of the hybrid
mismatch and did not share in the value of the tax
benefit resulting from this mismatch.
19. The different actors must examine the ‘terms
and conditions’ of an arrangement (and not only the
transaction creating the mismatch in tax outcomes) in
order to decide whether the facts and circumstances54
‘indicate that the arrangement has been designed to
produce a mismatch’ or whether a hybrid mismatch
has been ‘priced into the terms of the arrangement’.55
Due to its broad interpretation, the OECD sets out a
list of facts and circumstances indicating that an
arrangement has been designed to produce a hybrid
mismatch.56 Unfortunately, these factors are not con-
sidered exclusive or exhaustive. Other factors in an
arrangement may also lead to the conclusion that the
arrangement has been designed to produce a mis-
match in the tax outcomes.57
A tax benefit of the mismatch will be priced into the
(actual) terms and conditions of the arrangement ‘when
the mismatch has been factored into the calculation of
the return under the arrangement’. This will be the
case, for instance, when the terms of the instrument
explicitly provide for a formula that discounts what
would otherwise have been a market interest rate by
the amount of the tax benefit under the loan.58
20. The test of whether a structured arrangement
exists seems to be objective. It applies regardless of
the intentions of the parties.59 However, the test is
only based on what can reasonably be concluded from
the terms of the arrangement and the surrounding facts
and circumstances.60 It does not clearly identify when
the mismatch has been priced into the terms of the
arrangement or when the arrangement is designed to
create a hybrid mismatch. The fact that other indica-
tions that date from before or after the hybrid payment
may draw the conclusion that an arrangement is a
structured arrangement will create uncertainty.
Countries, therefore, might take a different approach
to consider a financial arrangement as a ‘structured
arrangement’ and to apply the hybrid financial instru-
ment mismatch rule.
21. A taxpayer can escape from being considered a
party of a structured arrangement if that person was
unaware of the hybrid mismatch and did not share in
the value of the tax benefit resulting from the hybrid
mismatch.61 This is a combination of a so-called
‘knowledge-test’ and a ‘tax benefit-test’.
22. The knowledge-test is intended to capture those
situations in which the taxpayer has the actual knowl-
edge (or is reasonably expected to be aware) that the
act conflicts with the purposes of the system or the
legislative intentions regardless of whether that per-
son has derived a tax advantage under that arrange-
ment. This can be considered as what a reasonable and
prudent person in the same position and in the same
circumstances should have known.62 It is not neces-
sary that the taxpayer undertakes additional due dili-
gence (as the test is based on the information available
to the taxpayer).63
Even if the taxpayer is unaware of the existence of
the hybrid mismatch arrangement, the actions of a
Notes
53 P. Carman, The Impact of the US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on Financial Transactions, 20(3) Derivatives & Fin. Instruments 6 (2018).
54 This concerns the relationship between the parties, the circumstances under which the arrangement was entered into, the steps and transactions that were undertaken to put
the arrangement into effect, and the economic and commercial benefits of the transaction. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 326, at 107.
55 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 322, at 106.
56 This list includes six different categories of arrangements. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 10, at 163.
57 As an example, four different factors are being mentioned. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 329 ff., at 108.
58 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 323, at 106.
59 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, at nr. 319 & nr. 343, pp. 106 & 111: ‘The knowledge-test is an objective test based on the information available to the
taxpayer and should not impose an obligation on a taxpayer to undertake additional due diligence on a commercial transaction over and above what would be expected of a
reasonable and prudent person. It applies, regardless of the parties’ intentions, whenever the facts and circumstances would indicate to an objective observer that the
arrangement has been designed to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes.’
60 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 321, at 106.
61 For example, the issuance of a bond that gives rise to a structured arrangement because the facts indicate that the bond has been marketed as a tax-advantaged product and
has been primarily marketed to persons who can benefit from the mismatch. Party X acquires the bond on initial issuance and is a party to that arrangement. Party X sells
the bonds to party Y, an unrelated company. Party Y will not be a party to the structured arrangement if it pays the market value for the bond and could not reasonably have
been expected to be aware of the mismatch in tax treatment.
62 Allen, supra n. 39, at 3–4. This can become of particular importance especially in case of the ‘imported mismatch rule’ (solution 3).
63 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 343, at 11.
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taxpayer’s agent will also be attributed to the
taxpayer.64 This will be the case, for instance, when
a beneficiary of a tax transparent trust receives dis-
tributions without knowledge of an existing hybrid
mismatch, but the benefits are facilitated by the
trustee. Although the beneficiary is not a direct
party to the agreement concluded by the trustee,
the tax consequences of the investment are imputed
to the beneficiary. The trust’s status as a party to a
structured arrangement is attributed to the benefi-
ciary together with the payment. The beneficiary,
therefore, is considered to be aware of the hybrid
mismatch and cannot escape from the application of
the hybrid financial instrument rule.65
23. In addition to being unaware, a second test
examines whether the taxpayer actually shared in the
value of the tax benefit resulting from the hybrid
mismatch.66 The OECD report provides the example
of a back-to-back loan structured through an unrelated
intermediary in order to provide a subsidiary with a
subordinated debt financing. The tax benefit under the
hybrid mismatch arrangement is returned to the parent
company in the form of an above-market rate of
interest.67 The tax administration does not need to
establish that the taxpayer has actually received a
benefit.68 It is the taxpayer, who is unaware of the
existence of the mismatch, who bears the burden of
proof that this individual did not share in the value of
the tax benefit resulting from the hybrid mismatch.
3.3.2 Material Scope: Payments Under a Financial
Instrument, Hybrid Transfers and Substitute
Payments
24. The OECD BEPS Action 2 Report does not
attempt to identify and define all of the transactions in
which a hybrid mismatch could occur. Instead it for-
mulates three different categories of ‘arrangements’69
dealing with financial instruments.
The first category focuses on a payment made
under an arrangement providing for an equity or
financing return. Although the payment is consid-
ered to be deductible, the income is not considered
as ordinary income of the payee. The arrangement
itself should qualify as a financial instrument
under local law. Payments in execution of a sales
contract, an asset transfer, or a contract for the
assumption of non-financial risk are not targeted.
Therefore, to define the first category of payments
generating a D/NI outcome, a definition is needed
of what is considered to be a ‘financial instrument’
and a ‘payment’ as well as when a payment can be
considered being ‘made under’ a financial
instrument.
Although payments for an asset transfer are gen-
erally not included in the scope of this rule, the
transfer of a financial instrument can be organized
in such a way that two jurisdictions take opposing
opinions on who has the ownership of the underlying
assets and is entitled to the financing or equity
return of it. This will generate a second category of
envisaged arrangements, for example, sale and
repurchase transactions or securities lending transac-
tions. The return of underlying assets will be attrib-
uted to one party (x). According to one jurisdiction’s
(X) perspective, this will be the legal consequence of
the ownership of that party (x). The other jurisdic-
tion (Y), however, will consider this attribution as an
additional (deductible) payment that is made by the
legal owner of the assets (y) according to its legal
qualification. This opposition results in a deductible
payment for y, with no corresponding taxable
income for x, based on the hybrid qualification of
the transfer of the financial instrument. Defining
this category requires a precise definition of a ‘hybrid
transfer’.
Whereas the first two categories focus on arrange-
ments that generate a hybrid outcome, the third and
final category does not focus on the arrangement itself
Notes
64 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 347 ff, at 112.
65 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 10.4, at 441.
66 Recommendation 10, OECD BEPS Action 2 report, at 105; Allen, supra n. 39, at 3–4. See also G. S. Cooper, Some Thoughts on the OECD’s Recommendations on Hybrid
Mismatches, 69(6/7) Bull. for Int’l Tax’n 342 (2015). Cooper states that ‘there are practical difficulties in applying these rules to widely held instruments where the treatment
of the payer might be contingent on the treatment of holders in many different states’.
67 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 10.2, at 435.
68 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 343, at 111.
69 For a definition of the term ‘arrangement’, see OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 165. In general, every agreement (e.g. gentlemen’s agreement), contract,
scheme (e.g. collective investment scheme), plan (e.g. investment plan), or understanding (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding) could be considered as an arrangement. The
arrangement may also be part of another (wider) arrangement, (e.g. a master agreement such as a GMSLA (Global Master Securities Lending Agreements) or ISDA
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association) Master Agreement), a single arrangement, or it may be comprised of a number of arrangements. However, the scope of the
hybrid mismatch rules particularly seems to focus on ‘contracts’ between two or more parties that are legally binding and enforceable in front of a Court.
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but immediately targets the outcome of a particular
payment. If a financial instrument is transferred, and
its underlying financing or equity return is reim-
bursed to the transferee, this compensation will be
envisaged as a ‘substitute payment’ if any of three
mentioned possible consequences70 is realized when
compared with a direct regular payment.
Only arrangements that are treated as debt, equity,
or derivative contracts under local law (category 1)
and hybrid transfers (category 2) are treated as a type
of financial instrument. Therefore, the focus will
only be on the first two categories.
3.3.2.1 First Category: Payments Made Under a
Financial Instrument
25. The hybrid financial instrument rule neutralizes
mismatches caused by payments made under a finan-
cial instrument. This category is extremely broad as
both the description of a ‘financial instrument’ and a
‘payment’ are very general. Besides defining a ‘financial
instrument’ and a ‘payment’, the link between the
payment and the financial instrument must also be
considered.
26. The definition of a ‘financial instrument’ is ulti-
mately left to each individual jurisdiction.71 The
OECD refers to an arrangement in which one person
provides money to another in consideration for a
financing72 or equity73 return. All (types of) financial
instruments – to the extent they produce a financing or
equity return – could be in scope of the definition.74
Bonds and stock are traditional examples, however,
derivative instruments75 and (other) synthetic securi-
ties, trackers, and structured products can also be clas-
sified as types of financial instruments. Agreements for
the supply of services such as an (ordinary) lease76 or
licensing agreement or agreements for the assumption
of a non-financial risk (such as insurance) are not con-
sidered as financial instruments for the hybrid mis-
match rule.77 Asset transfers under local law will also
generally be out of scope of this first category.
The OECD encourages countries to make reasonable
endeavours to adopt similar definitions of a financial
instrument.78 However, the final determination of the
type of arrangements ensconced within this definition
(and, therefore, potentially subject to adjustment
under the hybrid financial instrument rule) is ulti-
mately left to the discretion of each jurisdiction.79 In
the event of doubt, each jurisdiction should determine
under local law whether and to what extent a payment
is made under a financial instrument.
27. Nonetheless, recommendation 1.2a offers some
type of a definition: a financial instrument, as it can
be considered under this first category, is ‘any arrange-
ment that is taxed under the rules for taxing debt,
equity or derivatives under the laws of both the payee
and payer jurisdictions’. However, this still incites
several questions.
First of all, the text refers to a ‘taxed arrangement’.
However, whereas any arrangement can provide taxable
income flows, the arrangement itself is not a taxable
event for income taxes. It is the income arising from an
arrangement that can be submitted for income taxa-
tion. Under the arrangement, two separate value flows
can be detected. On one side, value is being transferred
for which, on the other side, a financing or equity
return is offered. It seems that the treatment of this
return should be the treatment applied to debt, equity,
or derivatives under domestic tax rules.
Notes
70 Improving the tax outcome for the transferor, a deduction of the expense for the transferee without including the return of the underlying asset as taxable income or avoiding
the first category throughout the transfer.
71 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 20, at 25.
72 Financing return on an arrangement is ‘a return on that arrangement i.e. economically equivalent to interest or where it is reasonable to assume, after consideration of the
terms of the arrangement, that the return is calculated by reference to the time value of money provided under the arrangement’. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report,
supra n. 1, Recommendation 12, at 121.
73 Equity return on an arrangement means ‘a return on that arrangement i.e. economically equivalent to a distribution or a return of profits or where it is reasonable to assume,
after consideration of the terms of the arrangement, that the return is calculated by reference to distributions or profits’. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1,
Recommendation 12, at 121.
74 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 1.2., (c), at 23 & nr. 63, at 35.
75 Although there is no definition of derivatives i.e. applicable for all tax law purposes, they may be characterized as those financial instruments ‘under which the payment
rights and obligations of the parties (and, therefore, the value of the contract) derive from the value of an underlying asset, index, or other measurable item.’ Examples are
forward contracts, options, futures contracts, swaps, mortgage-backed securities, structured notes, etc.
76 Although, in principle excluded, a financial lease as a financial arrangement can still be covered by the financial instrument rule. Hence, payments under a financial lease
could be subject to adjustment. See, for instance, OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.25, at 242.
77 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 64, at 35–36.
78 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 65, at 36.
79 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 19, at 25.
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Secondly, the ‘definition’ refers to the treatment
under the laws of both the payee and payer jurisdic-
tions. Whereas a mismatch can arise for the qualifi-
cation of the return for, e.g. a profit participating
loan, it is also perfectly imaginable that a mismatch
arises because only one party considers an arrange-
ment to be a financial instrument. The report pro-
vides an example of an arrangement that is qualified
as a finance lease according to one jurisdiction
whereas the other jurisdiction qualifies this arrange-
ment as a rental contract. Also, when only one of
both of the involved jurisdictions recognizes an
existing financial instrument, this jurisdiction
might still apply the hybrid financial instrument
rule.80 Therefore, the qualification of an arrangement
as a ‘financial instrument’ can also come from only
one jurisdiction.
28. Themismatch is caused in the tax treatment of the
payment made under the financial instrument. This
proves again that mismatches are typically the result of
technical differences in the way jurisdictions tax the
outcome of the instruments and not the differences in
the way the instrument itself is legally treated by the
jurisdiction.
29. The ‘payment’, being the flow that is recog-
nized for income tax purposes,81 also has a broad
scope. It is described as ‘any transfer of value’82
which, however, is not further defined. It can only
be assumed that the term ‘transfer of value’ can be
considered as the acceptance of cash, cheques, and
any other monetary instruments or other stores of
value including interest, dividend, royalties, rents,
and fees. Any present or future transfer of value
will also be within the scope.83 It additionally
includes any amount ‘capable of being’ paid such
as a future or contingent obligation to make a
payment and including (but not limited to) a
distribution, credit, debit, and accrual of money.84
Hence, the accrual of a future payment obligation,
even when the accrued amount does not
correspond to any increase in the payment during
that payment, can be considered as a payment.
This situation could arise when related parties
apply different accounting and tax treatments to
the same instrument.85
30. Payments that are ‘only deemed to be made
for tax purposes and that do not involve the crea-
tion of any new economic rights between the
parties’ will be excluded from the mismatch.86
The OECD wants to avoid that regimes for
which the tax deduction is not linked to any
payment obligation of the issuer would come
under the scope of the hybrid mismatch rule.87
This is relevant for rules that entitle taxpayers to a
unilateral tax deduction for invested equity with-
out requiring the taxpayer to make a payment.
Such regimes that grant deemed interest deduc-
tions for equity capital are economically closer to a
tax exemption or similar taxpayer specific conces-
sions and do not produce a mismatch in a tax
outcome under the hybrid financial instrument
rule.88 For instance, the Belgian notional interest
deduction intends to reduce the impact of the
distinction between equity and debt capital in
corporate financing decisions. Belgian companies
receive a deduction calculated on their equity
inspired by the interest cost to obtain such
capital.89 As Belgian tax law does not require an
actual payment to the shareholders; this regime is
not covered by the hybrid financial instrument
rule.
31. Finally, the payment must be ‘made under’ the
financial instrument. It is the (financing or equity)
return for the previous provision of ‘money’, e.g. a
dividend payment to the shareholders of the asset or
an interest payment to the holders of a note can be
considered as a payment made under a financial
instrument. Payments that are in consideration for a
release from a requirement, debt, or obligation under
a financial instrument will also be considered as a
Notes
80 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 68, at 37.
81 Compare with OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 423, at 132, referring to ‘money’ (including money’s worth).
82 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 28, at 27.
83 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 28, at 27.
84 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 12, at 123.
85 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.13, at 213.
86 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 12, at 123.
87 See Cooper, supra n. 67, at 42. In this context, Cooper states that ‘the reference to payments that “involve the creation of economic rights between the parties” suggests that
foreign tax credit duplication arrangements are not within the scope of the rule’.
88 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 11, at 18.
89 BE: Art. 205bis and following Income Tax Code 1992.
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payment made ‘under a financial instrument’.90
However, the release itself will not constitute a pay-
ment ‘under the hybrid financial instrument rule’.91
32. If a person pays for the transfer of an existing
financial instrument (e.g. the payment to acquire a
bond), this payment is a ‘payment for the disposal of
the instrument’ rather than a ‘payment under a finan-
cial instrument’. However, the payment to acquire a
financial instrument could still be treated as a ‘pay-
ment under a financial instrument’ in certain circum-
stances if the acquisition discharges (in whole or
part) obligations owed under the instrument or neu-
tralizes the economic and tax consequences for the
issuer.92
33. It can be concluded that this first category has
a broad scope. Any flow of income as a return for an
investment in a financial instrument can be envi-
saged when it occurs between related parties or
under a structured arrangement. If it results in a
D/NI outcome, the OECD suggests neutralizing
this mismatch.
3.3.2.2 Second Category: Hybrid Transfers
34. A hybrid transfer is ‘an arrangement or trans-
action with a financial instrument’. As a consequence
of the economics of the transaction and the way it is
structured, the laws of different jurisdictions take
opposing views (from a tax perspective) as to whether
the transferor or the transferee has the ownership of
the underlying asset93 or whether an additional
deductible payment should be recognized. A hybrid
transfer may also exploit differences between juris-
dictions in attributing income from a financial asset
with the effect that the same payment is treated as
simultaneously received by different taxpayers who
are resident in different jurisdictions.
Although it is rather ‘an arrangement to transfer a
financial instrument’,94 the OECD recommendation
includes this transfer agreement in the definition of a
financial instrument.95
35. Types of (potential) hybrid transfers are
collateralized loan arrangements or derivative
transactions in which the jurisdictions of both
parties treat their resident as the owner of the
loan collateral or subject matter of the derivative.
The hybrid financial mismatch rule will target
sale, repurchase (repo), and securities lending
transactions96 for which the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties are structured in such a way
that the transferor remains (finally) entitled to
the financing or equity return on the financial
instrument transferred under the arrangement
(Figure 3).
Figure 3. Example: Loan Structured as a Share Repo
State X State Y
Transferor Transferee
Share Transfer
Amount X
Repo
Dividend
Manufactured 
Dividend
State Z
Under the repo, the transferor (x) conveys shares
to the transferee (y) under an agreement that the
transferor will acquire those shares at a future
date for an agreed price (repo). According to
one State (Y), the transferee it is entitled to
receive the return of the underlying asset
whereas, according to the other State (X), the
underlying return still belongs to the transferor.
The payment (the ‘manufactured dividend’) under
Notes
90 This is the case, for instance, when a party receives a payment in consideration for an agreement to modify the terms of a debt instrument (e.g. lowering the interest rate of a
loan) or when a party releases the counterparty from the obligation to make any further payments of principal and accrued interest. See also OECD BEPS Action 2 Final
Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.18, at 226.
91 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 7, at 226.
92 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 71, at 38 and Example 1.19, at 227.
93 Strictly speaking, the ‘ownership’ of the underlying asset refers to the person entitled to receive the (tax exempt) return of the underlying asset.
94 However, the transfer could be considered as creating an arrangement that inherently qualifies as a financial instrument. The initial transferring of the underlying financial
instrument is an investment whereas the refunding of obtained benefits could be considered as the return.
95 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 1.2 (a) at 23.
96 The difference between a repo and a share lending arrangement is that the original transfer of the shares is not for a defined amount of consideration. Instead, the borrower’s
obligation is to transfer the same or identical securities back to the lender at a later date.
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the repo creates a deduction in the State of the
transferee (Y) while the State of the transferor (X)
treats the same payment as a return on the under-
lying shares (treated as if it were an exempt
dividend). The difference in tax treatment allows
the transfer to be used as part of a structured
arrangement to set up a cross-border mismatch
(Figure 4).97
Figure 4. Example 2: Net-Paying Repo
State X State Y
Transferor Transferee
Share Transfer
Amount X
Repo
Amount X= Y- DIV
Dividend
Manufactured 
Dividend
State Z
This previous example can be contrasted with a net-
paying repo. This will be the case if the transferee (y)
does not pay the dividends received on the underlying
shares to the transferor (x) (being the ‘economic
owner’ of the shares). The transferor (x) will only
acquire those shares at a future date for an agreed
price that represents a ‘financing return minus any
distributions received on shares by the transferee dur-
ing the term of the repo’. The payment that results in
the D/NI outcome is the dividend on the transferred
shares that is retained by the transferee under the
repo. The State of the transferor (X) treats the divi-
dend paid on the transferred shares as a deductible
expense under the repo (because the repo is character-
ized as a loan) while the State of the transferee (Y)
treats the same dividend payment as a return on the
underlying shares (the lender retains the dividend as
part of the agreed return on the loan and, accordingly,
as exempt from taxation). The resulting mismatch
could be a hybrid mismatch because it is attributable
to the difference in the way both States characterize
and treat the payments made under the repo.98
36. Both examples illustrate that this second cate-
gory is rather caused by the qualification of the share
transfer as ‘borrowing versus sale and repurchase’.
Nonetheless, the OECD aligns the consequences of
this hybrid transfer with the treatment of financial
instruments99 (and the contrasting perspective of
debt versus equity).
It should be noticed, however, that a hybrid transfer
can also be generated in the event that the underlying
received return is not exempted from tax in the country
where a payment is deducted.100 This substantiates
that it does not matter whether the funds that are
obtained under the transfer have been invested in assets
that generate a taxable or exempt return.
37. Under local law, an asset transfer will generally
not be treated as (a transaction with) a financial instru-
ment under the hybrid financial instrument rule (as it
does not provide for a financing or equity return).
However, e.g. think of an interest payment for the
transfer of an asset. Whereas the interest is part of the
sales price being paid later and not included as sepa-
rate taxable income, according to one party, the other
State may recognize a separate deductible payment
besides the mere price to be paid for the transfer.101
This once again reveals that treatment as a financial
instrument in one jurisdiction can suffice.102
3.3.2.3 Mismatch Attributable to ‘the Terms of
the Instrument’
38. A payment under the first or second category
only results in a hybrid mismatch when the mis-
match can be attributed to ‘the terms of the
instrument’.103 The terms of the instrument are
‘the factors or elements’ that affect the (tax) treat-
ment of the instrument itself’ and, as a result, the
Notes
97 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.32, at 261.
98 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.31, at 256.
99 The same rules will apply for testing whether the mismatch in tax outcomes is a hybrid mismatch. The mismatch in outcomes must be attributed to the tax treatment of the
hybrid transfer under the laws of the payer and payee jurisdictions. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 24, at 26.
100 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Examples 1.33, at 266. This illustrates a share lending for which a manufactured dividend is paid to the lender. Although
the country of the borrower taxes the underlying dividend, the reimbursing of this dividend to the lender is still deductible in the borrower’s country and not taxable in the
State of the lender.
101 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.27, at 246 provides an illustration of these types of transactions.
102 See Cooper, supra n. 67, at 340.
103 This is unlike the category of the substitute payments which applies to any type of D/NI outcome regardless of how it arises.
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tax consequences of a payment under the financial
instrument. Knowing whether a mismatch is attri-
butable to the terms of the instrument requires a
counterfactual test that questions whether the
terms of the instrument were sufficient to bring
about the mismatch in tax outcomes. This can be
done ‘by “contrasting the parties” actual tax treat-
ment with what it would have been if the instru-
ment had been held directly, and both the payer
and payee were ordinary taxpayers that computed
their income and expenditure in accordance with
the ordinary rules applicable to taxpayers of the
same type. If the same mismatch would have arisen
had the instrument been directly entered into by a
taxpayer of ordinary status, then the mismatch will
be attributable to the terms of the instrument itself
rather than the status of the taxpayer or the context
in which the instrument is held’.104 The OECD
BEPS Action 2 Report provides different examples
of mismatches in tax outcome that are either attri-
butable to the terms of the instrument105 or (solely)
attributable to other terms.106
39. The fact that a mismatch in tax outcome is
also attributable to ‘other factors’ does not prevent
the application of the hybrid financial instrument
rule. Only differences that are ‘solely’ attributable
to the status of the taxpayer or the circumstances
in which the instrument is held will not result in
a hybrid mismatch. For example, a mismatch in
tax treatment that arises in respect of a cross-
border payment made to a taxpayer in a pure
territorial tax regime will not be captured by the
hybrid financial instrument rule. The mismatch in
tax outcomes is solely attributable to the nature of
the payer and not to the terms of the instrument
itself.107 However, the mismatch will be caught
by the mismatch rule if the exemption on foreign
source income is only applicable to a particular
category of income (i.e. dividends). The tax
exemption then not only depends on the source
of the payment itself, but also the character of the
instrument under the laws of the payee jurisdic-
tion (and, accordingly, the terms of the instru-
ment) is decisive. In the latter case, the payment
could still fall within the scope of the hybrid
financial instrument rule.108
40. It is the taxpayer who will have to prove that a
mismatch in tax outcome is ‘solely’ attributable to
‘other’ factors or elements.
3.3.2.4 Regulatory Capital Instruments
41. The effect of the hybrid financial instrument rule
for regulatory capital instruments is particularly rele-
vant for the financial industry. This reason is found in
the regulatory regimes governing the financial sector.
Some of the hybrid financial instruments are specifi-
cally designed to satisfy these regulatory requirements.
For example, in the wake of the financial crisis, the
Basel III regulatory framework began requiring banks
to issue (additional) capital instruments in order to
replenish their regulatory capital.109 The increase of
Notes
104 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 51, 58 and 95, at 32, 35 and 42.
105 For example, Company x provides Company y with a subordinated loan. Both companies are resident in Country X. Due to differences in the way the interest is accounted
for tax purposes by the two companies, the interest is treated as deductible by Company y in the year it accrues but is only treated as income by Company x when (and if)
such interest is actually paid. The terms of the loan are such that Company x will be unable to establish, to the satisfaction of the tax authority, that the payment will be
made or can be expected to be made within a reasonable period of time. This mismatch in tax outcomes arises due to the various ways that Companies x and y account for the
payments of interest under the loan. The ability to apply different accounting (and, by extension, tax) treatments to the same instrument means that the mismatch is
attributable to differences in the tax treatment of the instrument (itself) under the laws of the same jurisdiction. For more examples, see OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report,
supra n. 1, nr. 91 and seq., at 41 ff.
106 For example, the hybrid financial instrument rule does not apply to mismatches that are solely attributable to the status of the taxpayer. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final
Report, supra n. 1, nr. 95 and seq., at 42 ff.
107 See also OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.7, at 195.
108 See also W. Hwa See, The Territoriality Principle in the World of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative: The Cases of Hong Kong and Singapore – Part II, 71(2)
Bull. Int’l Tax’n 123 (2016). Hwa See provides the example of Hong Kong and Singapore. Hong Kong has a ‘pure’ territorial tax system under which a mismatch in tax
treatment arises from a cross-border payment made to a taxpayer in Hong Kong would generally not be targeted by the hybrid financial instrument rule. Unlike Hong
Kong, Singapore has a semi-territorial tax system that taxes foreign-source income including dividends i.e. remitted to Singapore. An exemption of foreign dividends is only
available if specified conditions are satisfied. Based on the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report, it appears that mismatches in tax treatment arising from a cross-border payment
made to a taxpayer in Singapore – assuming that it is treated as a dividend – will be captured by the hybrid financial instrument rule.
109 Basel III, issued on 16 Dec. 2010, is an internationally agreed set of measures developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in response to the financial crisis of
2007–2009. The measures aim to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and risk management of banks. See BIS, Basel III: International Regulatory Framework for Banks,
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (accessed 14 Oct. 2019). In the EU, the implementation of the Basel III framework is reflected in the Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 176/338, (27 June 2013) (the CRD IV Directive).
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the capital levels under Basel III definitely impacts the
use of hybrid financial instruments.
The total banks’ regulatory capital consists of
Tier-1 capital that includes common equity Tier-
1 (CET1) and additional Tier 1 as well as Tier-2
capital (such as convertible capital instruments110
or bail-in bonds).111 CET1 – capital is essentially
equity capital and cannot qualify as an instrument
having a debt character (allowing deduction of
payments made) for tax purposes. However, the
tax classification (debt or equity) of additional
Tier 1 (AT1) and Tier 2 (AT2) capital is less
clear. Financial institutions must fulfil their pru-
dential obligations through these capital instru-
ments that have both debt and equity-like
features. Qualified as debt, they generate regular
remuneration payments but being subordinated,
perpetual, and automatically convertible to ordin-
ary shares in periods of stress, they also resemble
equity. This may increase the likelihood of a
hybrid mismatch in tax outcomes.
42. The implementation of the OECD recom-
mendations on hybrid financial instruments could
have the effect of discouraging financial institu-
tions to raise AT1 and AT2 capital, although the
primary reason for issuing such capital is to man-
age solvency and/or financial ratings. This is not
used as a tool for tax-planning. The issuance of
any AT1 or other regulatory capital also has to be
approved by the issuing bank’s supervisory
authority.
43. The relevance of regulatory capital instruments
was pointed out in the Action 2 Discussion Draft on
neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrange-
ments. According to the OECD, it is assumed that
AT1-instruments that are issued directly to the mar-
ket are unlikely to be captured by either a related-
party hybrid mismatch rule or a more widely drafted
rule that contains a specific carve-out for ‘widely-
held’ or ‘traded’ instruments.112 However, countries
are left to their own discretion in their policy choices
as to whether the hybrid mismatch rules should be
applied to mismatches that arise under intra-group
hybrid regulatory capital.113 Whether one country
decides to not apply the rules to neutralize a hybrid
mismatch in respect of a particular hybrid regulatory
capital instrument does not affect another country’s
policy choice to apply the rules regarding the parti-
cular instrument.114
3.4 Mismatch in Tax Outcome: D/NI
Mismatch
44. A mismatch in tax outcome in respect of a
payment made under a financial instrument will only
arise if the payment is ‘deductible’115 under the laws of
one jurisdiction, but no corresponding income116 is
included in the tax base of another State.117 This will
Notes
110 A specific example of additional Tier-2 capital are the Contingent convertible instruments (CoCos). CoCos are fixed- income instruments that are convertible into equity if a
trigger event occurs.
111 See also M. Krause, International – Basel III: The Regulatory Framework, 14(1) Derivatives & Fin. Instruments 16 (2012).Citation: M. Krause, Basel III: The Regulatory
Framework, 14(1) Derivs. & Fin. Instrums. (2012), Journals IBFD.
112 OECD, Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, nr. 160, 41, (OECD Publishing, 19 Mar. 2014), https://www.oecd.org/
ctp/aggressive/hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-discussion-draft-domestic-laws-recommendations-march-2014.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
113 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid mismatch Arrangements, supra n. 21, at 12.
114 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 12. See also OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, supra n. 21, at 12.
115 In most scenarios, a payment under a financial instrument will be deductible in the payer jurisdiction (which can include any jurisdiction where the payer is a taxpayer) when
the payment is qualified as an interest. However, ‘deductible payments’ under a financial instrument are not limited to interest. Also, issue discount and redemption
premiums, facilities and lending fees, and payments under derivative contracts can generate deductible payments to the extent they are treated as separate items of deductible
expenditure. Therefore, a payment will be deductible each time it causes an equivalent tax relief. This does not cover depreciations or amortizations. See OECD BEPS Action
2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 121, at 51.
116 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 41, at 30. A deductible payment (in the payer jurisdiction) will create a mismatch whenever the payee jurisdiction subjects
the payment to taxation at a rate i.e. less than the full marginal rate imposed on ordinary income regardless of the form in which such tax relief is provided. Mechanisms for securing
tax relief in the payee jurisdiction (by exclusion or through exemption, rate reduction, credit, or any other method) should not generally impact the final outcome under the hybrid
financial instrument rule. However, certain countries tax various types of income at different rates. For example, business or employment income may be taxed at a different rate than
investment income. These differences should be taken into account in determining whether the payment has been subject to tax at the taxpayer’s full marginal rate.
117 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 32, at 28. The OECD BEPS Action 2 Report refers to ‘included in the ordinary income’. Ordinary income are those
categories of income that are subject to tax at the taxpayer’s full marginal rate. These categories do not benefit from any exemption, exclusion, credit, or other tax relief i.e.
applicable to particular types of payments (such as indirect credits for underlying tax on the income of the payer). A payment will be treated as being included in ordinary
income to the extent that, after a proper determination of the character and treatment of the payment under the laws of the payee jurisdiction, the payment is required to be
incorporated as ordinary income into a calculation of the payee’s taxable income. A payment of ordinary income under a financial instrument will generally include interest,
dividends, and other investment returns that are subject to tax at the payee’s full marginal rate. Income is considered subject to tax at the taxpayer’s full marginal rate,
however, notwithstanding that the tax on the inclusion is reduced by a credit or other equivalent tax relief granted by the payee jurisdiction for withholding tax or other
taxes imposed by the source jurisdiction on the payment itself.
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result in a (direct or indirect118) D/NI outcome.
Payments that give rise to deduction/deduction (D/D)
outcomes119 are not covered by the hybrid financial
instrument rule.
45. The mismatch in tax outcome will be deter-
mined by comparing the laws of each jurisdiction
regarding the tax treatment of a payment under a
financial instrument. In analysing the application of
the local law, the ‘actual’ tax treatment (as the tax-
payer knows its own tax treatment) of the payment in
the taxpayers’ jurisdiction must be compared with its
‘expected tax treatment’120 in the counterparty juris-
diction. The character, amount,121 and timing122 of
payments under a financial instrument in both the
payer and payee jurisdiction are relevant elements to
determine whether a payment gives rise to a
mismatch.123 Although it is necessary to know the
identity of the counterparty124 and the applicable tax
rules of each jurisdiction, it is not required to know
the counterparty’s tax status to determine whether a
payment generates a hybrid mismatch.125
46. The mismatch in tax outcome can be partial.
This occurs when (1) a payment is only partially
treated as deductible under the laws of one jurisdic-
tion and not included in ordinary income by any
other jurisdiction or (2) a payment is treated as being
deductible under the laws of one jurisdiction, but
only a part of the payment is excluded from ordinary
income by any other jurisdiction.126
47. What happens if the mismatch in a tax outcome
is the result of timing differences? Timing differences,
as such, will not be considered to give rise to a hybrid
mismatch.127 This could be relevant when jurisdic-
tions use different tax accounting periods and have
different rules for recognizing when items of income
or expenditure have been received or incurred (e.g. the
payer jurisdiction adopts an accrual-based taxation
and the payee jurisdiction follows a cash-based
taxation).128 A deductible payment is not treated as
creating a mismatch if it is included by the payee in
ordinary income in an accounting period that com-
mences ‘within twelve months of the end of the
payer’s accounting period’.
Even if the payment does not meet the requirements
of this safe harbour of twelve months, the payer is still
entitled to deduct the payment if the payee, to the
satisfaction of the tax administration, can be expected
to include129 the payment in ordinary income ‘within
a reasonable period of time’.130 The determination of
whether this payment will be made within a reason-
able period of time should be based on the time
period that might be expected to be agreed between
unrelated parties acting at arm’s length.
Notes
118 These are payments that are deductible under the rules of the payer jurisdiction and that are set-off by the payee against a deduction under a hybrid mismatch arrangement.
119 This rather concerns payments made by hybrid entities that are not being dealt with in this article.
120 In general, it will not be necessary for the taxpayer or tax administration to know precisely how the payments under a financial instrument have actually been taken into
account in the calculation of the counterparty’s taxable income in order to apply the rule. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 85, at 40. This could result
in double taxation. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.29, at 251: ‘The fact that a payee acts as trader and may include by the payment in
ordinary income as proceeds from the disposal of trading assets will not impact on the determination of whether the terms of the instrument and the payments made under it
are expected to give rise to a D/NI outcome.’
121 This is the amount i.e. capable of being paid.
122 Nonetheless, the hybrid financial instrument rule does not generally apply to differences in the timing of the recognition of payments under a financial instrument. See
margin nr. 47.
123 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 53, at 33. Differences in tax outcomes that are ‘solely’ attributable to differences in the value ascribed to a payment
(including through the application of transfer pricing) do not fall within the scope of the hybrid mismatch rule). Therefore, a mismatch does not arise simply because of
differences resulting from converting foreign exchange into local or functional currency. Gains and losses that result from converting foreign exchange into local or functional
currency are attributable to the way jurisdictions measure the value of money rather than the value of the payment itself. See also OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n.
1, Example 1.15 and 1.16, at 219–222.
124 If the counterparty is transparent or has a taxable presence in more than one jurisdiction, it may be necessary to examine the laws of more than one jurisdiction to determine
whether the payment will give rise to a mismatch.
125 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 33, at 28 and nr. 84–86, at 40–41. See also OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.29, at 251: ‘The
fact that company A is a trader and may include the payment in ordinary income as proceeds from the disposal of trading assets will not impact on the determination of
whether the terms of the instrument and the payments made under it are expected to give rise to a D/NI outcome.’
126 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 10, at 17.
127 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 85, at 69. The burden of proof however remains with the taxpayer.
128 See also Santos, supra n. 41, at 510.
129 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 57, at 34. According to the OECD, ‘A payment can expected to be included in ordinary income where there was a
reasonable expectation at the time the instrument was issued that the payment would be made and that such payment would be included in ordinary income by the payee at
the time it was paid. If the terms of the instrument and other facts and circumstances indicate that the parties placed little commercial significance on whether payment
would be made, or if the terms of the instrument are structured in such a way that such payment, when it is made, will not be treated as giving rise to ordinary income in the
hands of the payee, then the payment cannot be said to be reasonably expected to be included in income.’
130 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 56, at 34.
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The given interpretation is rather subjective and
could differ between jurisdictions. Unfortunately,
the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report does not provide
additional information. It only mentions that the
terms of the instrument, the circumstances in which
it is held, and the commercial objectives of the par-
ties, taking into account the nature of the accrual and
any contingencies or other commercial factors affect-
ing payment, are factors that will be relevant for
determining the reasonable period of time.131 For
example, a secured loan that is used to finance infra-
structure investments may be expected to have longer
payment terms compared to an unsecured loan that is
utilized to fund working capital. It is also not clear
when the ‘reasonable period of time’ for income inclu-
sion begins. It seems reasonable to assume that this
period commences after the payment under the hybrid
financial instrument (and, for instance, the timing of a
deduction for tax purposes).132 However, it would be
beneficial to have additional guidance on the burden
of proof requested from a taxpayer in order to demon-
strate that a relevant payment is or will be included in
the taxable income of the recipient within a reason-
able period of time; a certificate of the tax authorities
of the recipient’s State could deliver the requested
proof.133
3.5 Neutralizing the Hybrid Financial
Mismatch
3.5.1 Particular Measures for the Tax Treatment of
Financial Instruments
48. A payment under a hybrid financial instru-
ment will not be treated as giving rise to a D/NI
outcome if the mismatch is neutralized in the payee’s
jurisdiction. The tax treatment of the payment could
be brought into accordance with the tax outcomes
that will generally apply to similar instruments in a
domestic context in the payee’s jurisdiction. Specific
rules of this nature will include any rule in that
jurisdiction, consistent with Recommendation 2.1.
of the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report, that limit the
availability of a dividend exemption or equivalent
tax relief for payments treated as a deductible pay-
ment by the payer State.134 Equally, jurisdictions
should consider adopting similar restrictions for
other types of dividend relief that are granted to
relieve economic double taxation on underlying
profits.
49. The administration of the payee jurisdiction
will examine the instrument under which the pay-
ment was made and whether the issuer of that instru-
ment was entitled to a deduction. Third States’ effects
do not appear to be taken into consideration. If a
dividend triggers a deduction for a separate taxpayer
in any other (third) jurisdiction – other than the
jurisdiction of the issuer – (e.g. due to the existence
of a hybrid transfer135), this will generally not lead to
a denial of the dividend exemption in the payee’s
jurisdiction.
This can be illustrated with the payment of a man-
ufactured dividend on shares having been subject to
a repo. The first example that should be referred to is
mentioned in margin nr. 35. It may be the case that
the State of the transferor (State X) has implemented
rules consistent with recommendation 2.1 that
would remove the benefit of a dividend exemption
when the payment is deductible for tax purposes. In
this case, however, recommendation 2.1 will gener-
ally not apply as it only considers the tax treatment
of the payment under the laws of the State of the
issuer (State Z) and whether the issuer was entitled
to a deduction for such payment. In this example,
the payment triggers a deduction for the repo coun-
terparty in a third jurisdiction (State Y). The pay-
ment, however, is not deductible for the issuer of the
shares (State Z). The recommended changes to
domestic law in recommendation 2.1, therefore, are
not expected to restrict the holder’s entitlement to
an exemption on the dividend.
50. The OECD BEPS Action 2 Report also pro-
vides a specific measure in the event that a hybrid
transfer allows parties to claim withholding tax
credits on payments that have the effect of
Notes
131 Ibid., nr. 58, at 34.
132 In this line, see also Santos, supra n. 41, at 510.
133 This can be compared with the certificate of residence i.e. required to obtain a reduction/an exemption of a foreign withholding tax based on a double tax convention.
134 Compare with Art. 4, 1a of the Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 Nov. 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and
subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ L 345/8, (29 Dec. 2011), (Hereafter: P/S Directive).
135 In order to prevent duplication of tax credits under a hybrid transfer, the Action 2 Report also recommends any jurisdiction that grants relief for tax withheld at source on a
payment made under a hybrid transfer to restrict the benefit of such relief in proportion to the net taxable income of the taxpayer under the arrangement. See OECD BEPS
Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, recommendation 2.2. at 45–46.
Intertax
30
lowering their effective tax burden under the
instrument. As mentioned in margin nr. 34, a
hybrid transfer (also) targets differences between
two countries’ rules for attributing income from
an asset with the result that the same payment is
treated as simultaneously received by different
taxpayers who are resident in different jurisdic-
tions. For example, a taxpayer (Company x) bor-
rows securities under an arrangement that
generally includes the requirement to make ‘man-
ufactured payments’ to the lender (Company y) of
any amounts paid on the underlying securities
during the period of the loan. Companies x and
y are treated as receiving an interest payment with
the result that both parties claim a withholding
tax credit on the payment made under the hybrid
transfer. In order to prevent the duplication of tax
credits under a hybrid transfer, the OECD recom-
mends limiting the ability of a taxpayer to claim
relief from foreign withholding tax on instruments
that are held subject to a hybrid transfer. This
restriction of the benefit of such relief should be
in proportion to the net taxable income of the
taxpayer under the arrangement.136
3.5.2 Two-tiered Approach: Restricting the
Deduction of a Payment or Taxing the Income
51. If themismatch in tax outcome is not neutralized
by a specific rule under domestic law, a further two-
tiered137 approach is suggested. The ‘primary response’
is to restrict the deduction of the payment for income
tax purposes. However, if the payer jurisdiction does
not restrict the deduction of the payment (or does not
introduce the anti-hybrid rule into its domestic tax
law), the payee jurisdiction should apply a secondary
measure. As a so-called ‘defensive rule’ to ensure the
effectiveness of the anti-hybrid rule, the payment is
taxed at the level of the beneficiary.138
52. Initially, the OECD requested the develop-
ment of instruments to put an end to or neutralize
the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements and
arbitrage.139 However, based on the design of earlier
drafts of the hybrid rules, the OECD concluded that
domestic law rules linking the tax treatment of an
instrument or transfer to its tax treatment in another
country had a significant potential as a tool to
address hybrid mismatch arrangements.140 The
finally proposed linking rules no longer search for
harmonization in qualification or well-balanced solu-
tions but only mitigate double non-taxation.141
They do not neutralize the effect of hybrid mis-
matches in general and, therefore, leave the case of
double taxation unresolved.
53. The underlying principle simply aligns the tax
treatment (not qualification) of payments under a
financial instrument in both States: a payer cannot
claim a deduction for a financing expense unless the
payment is included in ordinary income in the payee
jurisdiction. This outcome is achieved by adjusting
the deductions that are allowed under the laws of the
payer jurisdiction or including the income in the
payee jurisdiction, as appropriate, in order to ensure
that the abstract aggregate tax treatment of the
arrangement is the same regardless of the form of
instrument used or whether the adjustment is made
in the payee or payer jurisdiction. As the rules apply
automatically, the order prevents that more than one
country applies correctives to the same arrangement.
In this way, turning a D/NI-situation into an ND/I-
situation (non-deduction and inclusion) is avoided.
The order of corrective measures is formulated in
abstract and does not consider whether or to what
extent the person subject to the adjustment has ben-
efitted from the mismatch.
54. Although a full harmonization is not being
searched for, the linking rules make a domestic tax
treatment dependent on a tax treatment in the
counterparty. This complicates the application of
Notes
136 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 2.2. nrs. 112–113, at 47.
137 As not all States will want or will be able to implement such rules, they should implement a ‘primary rule’ to address these situations but should also be prepared to
implement a ‘defensive (secondary) rule’ to apply in situations in which the other State i.e. party to a transaction has not implemented the primary rule in its domestic law.
138 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 7, at 17.
139 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 15 (OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019). The
harmonization of domestic tax systems would obviously be the most effective way to eliminate mismatches at their source. However, considering current circumstances, this
appears to be a difficult option. For example, in 2011, the European Commission proposed to adopt a harmonized corporate tax base for European multinational enterprises
in combination with a tax consolidation regime that was referred to as the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). As this proposal proved to be too ambitious,
the Commission proposed to relaunch a new version of the CCCTB in 2016. However, it was still difficult to foresee a unanimous agreement being reached in the Council.
On 6 June 2019, the Council published its latest Presidency compromise on the file. Unfortunately, even if the current proposal of the CCCTB were implemented,
mismatches are likely to persist in the interaction between the framework of the common base and national or third-country corporate tax systems.
140 OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, supra n. 1.
141 See also L. Parada, Hybrid Entity Mismatches and the International Trend of Matching Tax Outcomes: A Critical Approach, 46(12) Intertax 981 ff (2018).
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domestic tax rules.142 The coordination and com-
mon application of the hybrid mismatch rules will
be vital.143 However, considering the unilateral
interpretation of the provisions, disagreements
may feasibly still cause further tax burdens. As
such, the qualification of the payment as being
made under a financial instrument is unilaterally
determined. If, e.g. the payee jurisdiction does not
qualify a payment as such, the primary rule will
still apply in the payer jurisdiction (as far as the
payment would be expected to generate a mis-
match in tax outcomes).144 However, conflicts
can arise when a taxpayer is unaware of the tax
treatment of payments under a financial instru-
ment for the calculation of the counterparty’s tax-
able income. If a deduction of a payment is
denied, whereas this income is ultimately taxed
at the level of the beneficiary following the elapse
of the ‘reasonable period of time’, double taxation
still arises.145
55. An additional difficulty is that the instrumen-
tal rules consider one payment as a whole. As stated,
partial mismatches146 can also appear but are not
envisaged. It is not unrealistic that a financial instru-
ment consists of various elements with multiple
underlying cash flows that result in one effective
payment. The linking rules are based on a singular
cash flow and make no distinction between multiple
payments made under a hybrid financial instrument.
In this context, it will be difficult to (additionally)
partially deny the deduction of the payment in the
payer jurisdiction or to tax parts of the payment in
the payee jurisdiction.147
56. The hybrid financial instrument mismatch
rules can be easily circumvented by importing
the mismatch outcome to a third State. This will
be the case when different structures are used and
layered on top of one another to shift the D/NI
outcome from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Therefore, this rather direct set of rules is further
complemented in the case of a third State that is
financing the creation of the hybrid payment
between two States that have not provided for
any of the recommended rules. Although the
imported mismatch rule is not the focus of this
article, it is relevant to understand how the rule
operates and prevents taxpayers from entering
arrangements that shift the effect of an offshore
hybrid mismatch into the domestic jurisdiction
through the use of a non-hybrid instrument such
as an ordinary loan.
An example could be a profit participating loan that is
treated as a loan from the borrower’s domestic law
perspective (b) and as equity from the lender’s domestic
law perspective (a). Company b (Country B) uses the
borrowed funds received from Lender a (Country A) to
grant a (regular) loan to another operational group
Company c (a resident in Country C). Company c is
allowed to deduct the interest payments on its loan
from Company b. Although Company b incorporates
the interest payments from Company c into its taxable
income, they are offset by the deduction of interest
payments to Company a. This latter deduction how-
ever, is not reflected by an inclusion of the interest
income in Country A as, according to its domestic law,
the payment is considered to qualify as equity. The
final result for States A, B, and C would be an interest
deduction (from a regular payment) in State C without
any net inclusion of this interest payment in any other
State.
Country B would first have to refuse the deduction
of b’s interest payments to Company a and thereby
increase the tax income of b. If this were not applied,
Country A would have to raise its tax income by
including the received payment in the taxable
income of Company a. If neither Country A nor
Country B raise their taxable income, Country C is
considered to have imported the mismatch and
should deny the deduction of the interest payment
supported by Company c, to the extent that this
Notes
142 See OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, supra n. 1. nr. 34, at 14. The Hybrids Report notes that this is, in itself, not a novelty as, in principle, foreign tax credits, subject-
to-tax-clauses, and controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules also require this link.
143 The report recognizes the importance of coordination in the implementation and application of the hybrid mismatch rules to ensure that the rules are effective and to
minimize compliance and administration costs for taxpayers and tax administrations. To do so, it sets out a common set of design principles and defined terms intended to
ensure consistency in the application of the rules. OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nrs. 272–315, at 94 ff.
144 In a case when the counterparty to the arrangement does not treat the adjustment as a payment under a financial instrument, the amount of the adjustment should be limited to
the portion i.e. treated under the payer jurisdiction as giving rise to a financing or equity return. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, example 1.27, at 246 ff.
145 See also Santos, supra n. 41, at 510.
146 See margin nr. 46.
147 Kahlenbergh & Kopec, supra n. 18, at 73; Cooper, supra n. 67, at 341.
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payment has been set-off against a hybrid mismatch
arrangement.148
3.6 General Conclusions Concerning the
OECD Initiative
57. The first section of this article illustrated
how the hybrid financial instrument rule under
the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report provides a
two-tiered approach to counter double non-taxa-
tion resulting from the deduction of a payment
from a tax base without the corresponding inclu-
sion of this income in another tax base. The rule
applies to ‘payments’ under a financial instrument
between ‘related parties’ or under a ‘structured
arrangement’.
The measure definitely provides inspiration for
national and international policy making against
so-called ‘aggressive tax planning’. However, both
the test of whether a financial instrument is a hybrid
arrangement and the proposed linking rules leave
many uncertainties and could result in odd out-
comes. The two-tiered approach largely depends
upon cooperation between the participating jurisdic-
tions and will certainly increase the complexity of
unilateral domestic tax systems. Nonetheless, since
its outcome, there has been general support for the
implementation of the OECD hybrid financial
instrument rule. For example, at the EU level, this
rule was progressively introduced in the ATAD as
will be further illustrated.
4 HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS UNDER
THE ATAD
4.1 General Remarks
58. After having elaborated the OECD initiative,
the second section of this article will focus on the
implementation of the hybrid financial instrument
rule in the European Union by means of the ATAD.
59. Contrary to the Commission’s initial proposal,149
the ATAD I150 only covered intra-EU situations invol-
ving hybrid entities and financial instruments.
Therefore, the ECOFIN-council requested already in
its meeting of 12 July 2016 that the Commission ‘put
forward a proposal by October 2016 on hybrid mis-
matches involving third countries in order to provide
for rules consistent with and no less effective than the
rules recommended by the OECD BEPS report on
Action 2, with a view to reach an agreement by the
end of 2016’.151
The result, the ATAD II,152 amending the ATAD I,
draws upon the recommendations of the OECD BEPS
Action 2 Report. It extends the scope and operation of
the hybrid mismatch rule also addressing hybrid mis-
matches with non-EU Member States and providing
operative rules for other additional mismatches.153
The Directive substantially amends the existing defi-
nitions bringing them in accordance with the BEPS
Action 2 Report. Whereas, under the ATAD I, the
implementation of the hybrid financial instrument
rule had been foreseen by 31 December 2018, it
extends the delay by one year (with a derogation for
the reverse hybrid mismatch rule which must apply as
from 1 January 2022).154
60. The ATAD II also explicitly refers to the
OECD BEPS Action 2 Report as a source of illustra-
tion/interpretation to the extent these recommenda-
tions are consistent with the provisions of the ATAD
and EU Law.155 Therefore, this part analyses simila-
rities and (potential) differences between the ATAD
and the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report and takes into
account comments made in the previous part.
4.2 The Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule
61. In very broad terms, the hybrid financial
instrument rule of Article 9, §2 ATAD follows
Notes
148 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, recommendation 8, at 83 ff.
149 This proposal opted to eliminate the cause of a hybrid mismatch aligning the different classifications of a financial instrument. The double non-taxation was avoided through
a ‘residence follows source’ approach with respect to the characterization of the financial instrument (the underlying problem). However, this obligated qualification has been
removed from the ATAD. The final solution that was provided only addresses the differences in (direct) D/NI outcome of the financial instruments thereby disregarding
situations of double taxation.
150 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, supra n. 12.
151 See EU Council, supra n. 13, at 497.
152 Council Directive (EU) 2017/952, supra n. 14.
153 Including hybrid permanent establishment mismatches, imported mismatches, reverse hybrid mismatches, tax residency mismatches, and hybrid transfers.
154 Art. 11, §5a ATAD.
155 See preamble nr. 27 ATAD II.
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the so-called ‘linking rules’ of the OECD-approach.
In a ‘deduction without inclusion’ outcome, the
deduction shall be denied in the Member State (as
far as the payment is sourced in a Member State)
being the payer jurisdiction. If the deduction is not
denied in the payer jurisdiction, the amount of the
payment causing the mismatch outcome shall be
included in the taxable income of the Member
State being the payee jurisdiction.
This must be further combined with Article 4a
P/S Directive that obligates a Member State to
refrain from taxing a parent company on distrib-
uted profits ‘to the extent that such profits are
not deductible by the subsidiary, and tax such
profits to the extent that such profits are deduc-
tible by the subsidiary’. Although initially devel-
oped from a different angle, this already reveals a
partial integration of OECD recommendation 2
that precedes the linking rules.156
62. Article 9, §3 ATAD addresses imported
mismatches157 in that an EU Member State
should deny payment deductions when they are
used to finance the creation of a hybrid mismatch
in two other States unless one of them has made
equivalent adjustments. As the first part did not
particularly focus in detail on ‘imported mis-
matches’, this §3 will not be analysed in detail.
However, in contrast with the OECD initiative,
the ATAD is binding for EU-Member States.
This raises the question as to whether the defen-
sive measure (or the imported mismatch rule)
applies if another Member State does not fulfil
its obligation to act in primary (or secondary)
order. Being analogue for both subsequent
actions, this question will be dealt with in mar-
gin nr. 97 after the comparison of the European
hybrid financial instrument rule with the OECD
recommendations.
4.3 Scope of the Rule
63. The EU rule applies to ‘a payment under a
financial instrument’ that is qualified as a ‘hybrid
mismatch’ between ‘associated enterprises’ or entered
into as part of a ‘structured arrangement’.158
4.3.1 Personal Scope
64. Whereas the OECD recommendation remained
relatively vague about its personal scope,159 the
ATAD is directed towards taxpayers who are subject
to corporate income tax160 in one or more Member
States. This includes permanent establishments in
one or more Member States of entities resident for
tax purposes in a third country.161 A further defini-
tion of ‘taxpayer’ and ‘corporate tax’, however, was
left for domestic interpretation when Member States
transpose the Directive.162
With regard to the hybrid financial instruments mis-
match rule, the two broad categories of the BEPS
Action 2 Report, i.e. related parties and structured
arrangements, are being repeated. However, whereas
the notion of a ‘structured arrangement’ is copied, the
ATAD refers to ‘associated enterprises’ instead of
‘related parties’. Finally, an exclusion for financial tra-
ders has been put more prominently in the forefront.
4.3.1.1 Associated Enterprises Instead of Related
Parties
65. ‘Related parties’ has been replaced by ‘associated
enterprises’, a more generalized concept of the ATAD.
For these general purposes ‘associated’ refers to:
(1) an entity in which the taxpayer directly or indir-
ectly holds participation in terms of voting rights or
capital ownership of 25% or more or is entitled to
receive 25% or more of the profits of that entity; and
Notes
156 See margin nrs. 48–49.
157 See margin nr. 56.
158 Art. 2, §9 and, in particular, Art. 2, § 9, al. 2, c) ATAD.
159 See margin nr. 15.
160 See Preamble nr. 4 ATAD I and Art. 1, §1 ATAD.
161 According to Fibbe & Stevens, hybrid mismatches with individuals are, as such, disregarded. See G. Fibbe & T. Stevens, Hybrid Mismatches Under the ATAD I and II, 26(3) EC
Tax Rev. 166 (2017). However, structures with individuals involved are not necessarily out of scope. For example, imagine Individual x (a resident of State X) holding a
capital ownership of 25% in Company y (a resident in State Y). Company y makes an interest payment under a hybrid financial instrument to Individual x. Company y is
entitled to a deduction for the interest payments whereas the payment is not treated as ordinary income in State X. As the mismatch is determined to be a hybrid mismatch
(involving a taxpayer), it is our opinion that State Y should still apply the hybrid mismatch rule and deny Company y a deduction for the payment made under the hybrid
financial instrument to the extent of that mismatch.
162 See Preamble nr. 4 ATAD I: Considering that it would result in the need to cover a broader range of national taxes, it is not desirable to extend the scope of this directive to types of
entities that are not subject to corporate income tax in a Member State (e.g. transparent entities). In this context, the question was raised as to whether reverse hybrid entities would
fall within the scope. This issue was solved under the ATAD II by introducing separate hybrid mismatch rules for reverse hybrid entities. See Art. 1, §2 and Art. 9a ATAD.
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(2) an individual or entity that directly or indirectly
holds participation in terms of voting rights or capital
ownership in a taxpayer of 25% or more or is entitled
to receive 25% or more of the profits of the taxpayer.
All directly or indirectly interconnected entities are
regarded as associated.163
66. The Directive does not clarify what is meant
with the terms ‘voting rights’ or ‘capital ownership’.
Considering preamble nr. 27, we refer to the OECD
BEPS Action 2 Report. The term ‘voting rights’
should hence be considered as ‘the right to partici-
pate in any decision-making concerning a distribu-
tion, a change to the constitution or the
appointment of a director’.164 Instead of ‘capital
ownership’, however, the OECD BEPS Action 2
Report refers to ‘equity interest’, meaning ‘an enti-
tlement to an equity return’. This rather seems to be
linked with the third option of being entitled to
receive the profits of the entity. ‘Capital ownership’,
therefore, is not further defined.
However, both concepts (voting rights and capital
ownership) also appear in Article 3 P/S- Directive
and Article 3, b) I/R-Directive.165 A common under-
standing for all of these European direct tax direc-
tives would also enhance tax certainty. Nonetheless,
at present, these concepts do not appear to invoke
particular questions.
As a taxpayer’s degree of ownership can vary over
time, it is our opinion that the participation thresh-
old should be met at the time of the payment (and
not, for instance, at the end of the year).
67. In particular with regard to hybrid mismatches,
the specified threshold for ‘associated enterprises’ is
further adapted. Except for hybrid financial
instruments and deemed payments, the 25% threshold
is replaced by a 50 % requirement which brings the
threshold in accordance with the OECD proposal.166
Additionally, the term ‘associated enterprises’ also
means (1) entities that are part of a same consolidated
group for financial accounting purposes167 and (2)
enterprises that have ‘significant influence’ in the man-
agement of the taxpayer (or in which a taxpayer has
significant influence in the management).168
68. The purpose of the (extended version) of the
term ‘related parties’ was to bring the definition in
line with the concept of ‘control group’ of the OECD
BEPS Action 2 Report. However, differences still
exist. The definition of ‘related parties’ does not
refer to the term ‘associated enterprises’ under
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention nor
is the concept of ‘effective control’ used.169 Instead,
Article 2, §4, al. 3, c) ATAD refers to enterprises in
which the taxpayer has ‘a significant influence’ in the
management (and, conversely, an enterprise that has
a ‘significant influence’ in the management of the
taxpayer). Such ‘significant influence’ seems less
compelling compared to ‘effective control’ as is
required under the OECD BEPS Action 2.170
Moreover, this ‘significant influence’ test is not a
new concept. It is also used in the international
financial reporting standards to determine whether
an entity should be included in consolidated finan-
cial statements.171
69. Article 2, §4, al. 3, b) ATAD also provides an
‘acting-in-concert’ test. The (voting or capital) rights of
persons acting together in respect of these rights are
aggregated for the purposes of applying the required
thresholds to be ‘related’. As mentioned in margin nr.
17, this measure preserves the effectiveness of the rule
Notes
163 Art. 2, §4 first part ATAD.
164 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Recommendation 12, at 123.
165 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation i.e. applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of
different Member States OJ L 157/49, (26 June 2003).
166 Art. 2, §4, al.3, a) ATAD.
167 See Art. 2, §10 ATAD. A ‘consolidated group for financial accounting purposes’ means ‘a group consisting of all entities which are fully included in consolidated financial
statements drawn up in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards or the national financial reporting system of a Member State’. This means that
entities that are fully included in the consolidated financial statements in accordance with the IFRS or the national financial reporting system of a Member State (GAAP)
will be in the scope of the hybrid financial instrument rule. We already referred to IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements which contains requirements for the
preparation and presentation of consolidated financial statements, requiring entities to consolidate entities they control.
168 Art. 2, § 4, al.3, c) ATAD.
169 See margin nr. 16.
170 See Allen, supra n. 39, at 2–3. According to Allen, the term ‘influence in the management’ may be speculated to include any power of the management i.e. beyond the
meaning of the ownership-related rights intended in the Hybrid Report.
171 According to IFRS 10, if one or more of the elements of control are not present, it will be necessary to determine the nature of the investor’s relationship with the investee.
An investor can have power over an investee even if other entities have existing rights that provide them the current ability to participate in the direction of the relevant
activities, e.g. when another entity has significant influence (IFRS 10, 12–14). See also IAS 28, § 3 according to which significant influence is ‘the power to participate in the
financial and operating policy decisions of the investee, but it is not control or joint control over these policies. When a fund manager has significant influence, the
investment fund is an associate of the fund manager’.
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and avoids tax planning schemes. It will prevent tax-
payers from circumventing the hybrid mismatch rule
by entering into arrangements that would allow them
to act together (or under the direction of a single
controlling mind). However, unlike the OECD BEPS
Action 2 Report, no particular definition or presump-
tion of what is considered to be ‘acting together’ is
provided. Whereas the Report also refers to ‘equity
interests’, the ATAD only mentions voting and capital
rights. In addition, it is unclear whether the acting-
together test will be effective if one or more taxpayers
are acting together from third countries. As the event
might occur outside the European Union, it will be
difficult to perform a correct analysis.172 Additional
information regarding the acting-together test and the
persons within the scope of the measure, therefore,
would certainly be welcome.
70. In conclusion, although the purpose was to
echo the OECD concept, the exact same
wording has not been used. This could lead to a
slightly different understanding of the envisaged
persons.
4.3.1.2 Party to a Structured Arrangement
71. The hybrid financial instrument mismatch
rule also applies to hybrid mismatches resulting
from a structured arrangement involving a tax-
payer. In accordance with the OECD BEPS
Action 2 Report, Article 2, §11 ATAD defines a
‘structured arrangement’ as ‘an arrangement invol-
ving a hybrid mismatch where the mismatch out-
come is priced into the terms of the arrangement
or an arrangement that has been designed to pro-
duce a hybrid mismatch outcome, unless the tax-
payer or an associated173 enterprise could not
reasonably have been expected to be aware of the
hybrid mismatch and did not share in the value of
the tax benefit resulting from the hybrid
mismatch’.
As the ATAD does not provide any additional gui-
dance, we refer to our analysis of the provisions of
the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report in order to under-
stand the meaning of this concept.174
4.3.1.3 Exclusion for Financial Traders
72. The hybrid financial instrument mismatch
rule is not applicable when a payment is made by
a financial trader175 under an on-market hybrid
transfer176 provided that the payer jurisdiction
requires the financial trader to include as taxable
income all amounts received in relation to the
transferred financial instrument.177 This means
that the carve-out will only apply if the following
cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (1) the payment
is made by a financial trader in the ordinary course
of business, (2) under a hybrid transfer, (3) not as
part of a structured arrangement, and (4) the finan-
cial trader shall include as income all amounts
received in relationship to the transferred financial
instrument. The ‘payment’ representing the under-
lying return on a transferred financial instrument
shall, in that case, not create a hybrid mismatch;
neither the payer nor the payee will have to apply
the linking rules.178 The effects of the carve-out for
the payee are, as such, contingent upon the fulfil-
ment of these four conditions by the financial trader
in the payer jurisdiction.
73. The rationale behind this carve-out is based
on the OECD recommendations that the hybrid
financial instrument rule should not affect the
ability of a trader to take the full amount that
is payable under the asset transfer agreement into
account when calculating the gain or loss on the
disposal of the asset. A trader that purchases and
sells securities will treat the net profit or loss on
each trade as included in taxable income (or
deductible for tax purposes, as the case may be)
regardless of the tax treatment of the underlying
Notes
172 See Santos, supra n. 41, at 507.
173 OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, refers to the ‘same control group’ instead of ‘associated enterprises’. See margin nr. 16.
174 See margin nrs. 18 ff.
175 A ‘financial trader’ is a person or entity engaged in the business of regularly buying and selling financial instruments on its own account for the purposes of making a profit.
(Art. 2, §9, al. 3, k) ATAD).
176 An ‘on-market hybrid transfer’ means any hybrid transfer i.e. entered into by a financial trader in the ordinary course of business and not as part of a structured arrangement.
(Art. 2, §9, al. 3, m) ATAD).
177 Art. 2, § 9, al 2, a) ATAD.
178 Art. 2, § 9, al 2, a) ATAD refers to Art. 2, § 9, al. 1 a) ATAD.
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return on the transaction.179 However, unlike the
ATAD, the payment (representing the underlying
return) made by the financial trader might still
be treated as falling within the scope of the
hybrid financial instrument rule to the extent
that it produces a D/NI outcome.180
4.3.2 Material Scope: Payments Under Financial
Instruments and Hybrid Transfers
74. The ATAD formulates two categories
of arrangements dealing with financial instruments.181
The first category results from conflicts with payments
made under a financial instrument that produces a
financing or equity return. The hybrid mismatch will
arise when a deductible payment under a financial
instrument is not included in the taxpayer’s taxable
income.
The second category focuses on hybrid transfers that
generate a difference in tax treatment if, as a result of
an arrangement to transfer a financial instrument, the
underlying return on that instrument is treated as being
received by more than one of the parties to the
arrangement.
4.3.2.1 First Category: Payments Made Under a
Financial Instrument
75. Similar to the OECD recommendations, the
first category intends to tackle mismatches caused
by ‘payments made under a financial instrument’. As
such, it is necessary to consider a financial instru-
ment, a payment, and the association between the
payment and the financial instrument.182
76. The EU encourages Member States to treat
‘any arrangement that produces a financing or equity
return as a financial instrument’. However, it is
ultimately again left to the discretion of each
Member State to determine whether an arrangement
is actually considered as one, hence, each Member
State might have its own interpretation as to
whether an arrangement is a financial instrument.
77. As mentioned, two separated flows can be
detected under the arrangement: value is transferred
to the payee for which a financing or equity return is
paid under the arrangement. What is at stake is the
tax treatment of the financing or equity return under
the rules for taxing debt, equity, or derivatives under
the domestic law.183
78. The definition of the term ‘financial instru-
ment’ states that the return of the arrangement
must be taxed under the domestic rules for taxing
debt, equity, or derivatives under the laws of either the
payee or payer jurisdictions.184 Hence, a hybrid mis-
match could arise because only one party considers
an arrangement as a financial instrument. Whereas
the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report refers to the tax
treatment under the laws of both the payee and payer
jurisdiction, it also further states that a mismatch
can also arise when only one party treats an arrange-
ment as a financial instrument. Therefore, finally,
both regimes accept a single State qualification as a
financial instrument to be sufficient to the extent
that the payment constitutes a financing or equity
return.185
79. The ATAD addresses mismatches arising from
differences in the characterization of the payments
made under a financial instrument.186 As hybrid
Notes
179 See T. Balco, European Union ATAD 2: Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, 57(4) Eur. Tax’n , nr. 4, 136 (2017), referring to OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, nr. 52,
at 33: ‘Taxpayers that buy and sell securities in the ordinary course of a business of dealing or trading in securities (such as securities dealers, banks and brokers) will treat the
net profit or loss on each trade as included in taxable income, or deductible for tax purposes, as the case may be, regardless of the exact way in which the return on the
transaction is accounted for or the manner in which the transaction is analysed for tax purposes.’
180 See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, Example 1.28, at 249. It remains unclear whether, according to the OECD, this can still cause the secondary
(defensive) rule to apply for the counterparty. In any case, inspiration can be found at the end of recommendation 1 which states that, in the case that the payment by
an investment vehicle is excluded, ‘the defensive rule … will continue to apply to any payment made by such an investment vehicle’. See OECD BEPS Action 2 Final
Report, supra n. 1, at 24.
181 Although the aim of the ATAD was to provide a framework i.e. consistent with and no less effective than the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report, it does not seem to address
arrangements involving the transfer of financial instruments when a payment is made in substitution for the financing or equity return on the transferred asset and
differences between the tax treatment of that payment and the underlying return on the instrument have the net-effect of undermining the integrity of the hybrid financial
instrument rule (‘substitute payments’).
182 See margin nrs. 25 ff.
183 See margin nr. 27.
184 Art. 2, §9, al. 3, j) ATAD.
185 See margin nr. 27.
186 Preamble nr. 16 ATAD II.
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mismatches are the result of ‘payments made under a
financial instrument’,187 it is acceptable to assume
that a unilateral tax deduction that is not linked to
any payment obligation of the issuer (e.g. notional
deduction measures) will not be in scope of the
hybrid mismatch rule.188
4.3.2.2 Hybrid Transfers
80. To align the EU rule with the OECD recom-
mendations, the ATAD also covers hybrid trans-
fers. They generate a difference in tax treatment if,
as a result of an arrangement to transfer a financial
instrument, the laws of two jurisdictions differ on
whether the transferor or the transferee has the
ownership of the payments on the underlying
asset or when the underlying return on that
instrument is treated as (simultaneously) being
received by more than one of the parties to the
arrangement.189 As said, although such transfers
are not financial instruments, as such, but rather
arrangements involving a financial instrument, the
OECD report nonetheless included them in the
definition of a financial instrument as is followed
in the ATAD.
81. Hybrid transfers target sale, repurchase (repo),
and securities lending transactions.190 These structures
are not impeded as such. The ATAD only addresses the
tax consequences when these structures are aimed at
benefitting from a mismatch situation.191 As illu-
strated, this could be the case if only one resident
State of a party to an arrangement recognizes a transfer
of assets as such.
The different tax treatment results in a mismatch
outcome if one jurisdiction treats a payment con-
nected with the income related to and derived
from the transferred instrument as a deductible
expense while the other jurisdiction regards the
same amount as a (tax-exempt) return on the
underlying asset itself. The hybrid transfer could
also generate a surplus tax credit for the tax
withheld at the source on the underlying
instrument.
4.3.2.3 Mismatch Attributable to the Terms of
the Instruments
82. Unlike the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report,192
the ATAD does not specifically mention that a
payment under one of both categories (only)
results in a hybrid mismatch when the mismatch
can be ‘attributed to the terms of the financial
instrument’. However, according to the ATAD, a
payment under a financial instrument (only) cre-
ates a hybrid mismatch if the mismatch outcome is
‘attributable to differences in the characterization
of the instrument or the payment made under
it’.193 These terms raise some questions. The pre-
cise meaning of ‘characterization’ is ambiguous. It
would have been clearer if the terms ‘tax classifica-
tion’ or ‘tax treatment’ were used. In addition, the
ATAD addresses mismatches that are the result of
differences in the characterization of the payments
under a (financial) instrument or the instrument
itself. Does it mean that, unlike the OECD BEPS
Action 2 Report,194 the differences in the charac-
terization of the payment do not have to be attri-
butable to the terms of the instrument? 195
Although not integrated in the Directive, the pre-
amble of the ATAD II specifically stipulates that
tax outcomes that are ‘solely’ attributable to dif-
ferences in the value ascribed to a payment
Notes
187 The definition of ‘deduction without inclusion’ also refers to ‘a deduction of a deemed payment’. However, this is only relevant for ‘deemed payments’ between the head
office and a permanent establishment or between two or more permanent establishments whereas the payment is disregarded under the laws of the payee jurisdiction.
188 Similar to the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, supra n. 1, see margin nr. 31.
189 Art. 2, §9, al. 3, l) ATAD.
190 See also margin nr. 35.
191 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries, COM(2016) 687 final 9 (25 Oct.
2016), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_687_en.pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
192 See margin nrs. 82 ff.
193 Art. 2, § 9, al. 1, a) (ii) ATAD.
194 As explained in the first part, the hybrid financial instrument rule under the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report only looks at the expected tax treatment of the arrangement
based on the terms of the instrument and the character of the payments made under it to determine whether the payment gives rise to a mismatch.
195 According to the preamble nr. 13 of ATAD I, hybrid mismatches were the consequence of differences in the ‘legal characterization of payments’ (of financial instruments).
The recital of the preamble was not translated in the rules. Art. 2, §9 ATAD I only addressed mismatches resulting from conflicts in the ‘legal characterizations of financial
instruments’ (to the extent that such rules do not affect the general features of the tax system of a Member State). Thus, the ATAD I did not address mismatches that are the
result of differences in the tax treatment of the payments under a financial instrument. Also the term ‘legal’ characterization incited discussions as it is the difference in the
tax treatment (or tax classification) that leads to a mismatch in the (tax) outcome.
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including through the application of transfer pri-
cing should not fall within the scope of a hybrid
mismatch.196 Furthermore, a payment under a
financial instrument will not generate a hybrid
mismatch if the tax relief that is granted in the
payee jurisdiction is ‘solely’ due to the tax status of
the payee or because the instrument is held under
the terms of a special regime.197
83. This means that – in accordance with the
OECD BEPS Action 2 Report – differences that are
‘solely’ attributable to the status of the taxpayer or
the circumstances in which the instrument is held
will not result in a hybrid mismatch. For example,
gains and losses from foreign currency fluctuations
on a loan can generate mismatches in tax outcomes,
however, these mismatches are solely attributable to
differences in the measurement of the value of pay-
ment (rather than its character).
Additionally, a mismatch in tax treatment that arises
in respect of a cross-border payment made to a taxpayer
in a ‘special regime’ will not be corrected. This measure
is probably meant to mirror the OECD statement that
the hybrid financial instrument rule does not apply to
mismatches that are solely attributable to the context
under which an instrument is held (e.g. payments to a
taxpayer in a pure territorial regime).198
4.3.2.4 Regulatory Capital Instruments
84. The OECD could not reach consensus with
regard to mismatches under intra-group hybrid reg-
ulatory capital. Although clarifying that regulatory
capital instruments were not intended to be captured
by the hybrid financial instruments rule, the final
determination was left to the discretion of each indi-
vidual State. Interactions between the hybrid mis-
match rule and the regulatory capital instruments,
therefore, could result in unintended outcomes and
potentially discourage financial institutions creating
AT1 and AT2 capital, although they are required to
issue additional capital instruments in order to replen-
ish their regulatory capital.199 A solution for these
conflicting international tax and regulatory concerns
was certainly necessary.
85. Different Member States were nonetheless initi-
ally reluctant to provide a specific carve-out for reg-
ulatory capital instruments as this could create
loopholes and lead to abuses from the financial
industry.200 Nevertheless, to reconcile these concerns,
the ATAD provides – without prejudice to the State
aid rules201 – the possibility to exclude from its scope
(and, as such, allow double non-taxation) a payment of
interest under a financial instrument to an associated
enterprise. The payment is excluded if the instrument
has been issued with the sole purpose of meeting the
issuer’s loss-absorbing capacity requirements and not
for the purposes of avoiding tax.202 As such, Member
States have the option of excluding an intra-group
financial instrument with conversion, bail-in, or write
down features from the scope of the hybrid financial
instrument rule. This is allowed only if that instru-
ment has been issued with the sole purpose of satisfy-
ing regulatory capital requirements and not to obtain
a tax advantage. In addition, the mismatch in tax
outcomes may only be expected to result in a single
deduction under the structure. This means that the
overall net deduction for the consolidated group
under the arrangement does not exceed the deductible
amount it would have had if the taxpayer had issued
such a financial instrument directly to the market.203
This involves contingent capital securities issued by
financial institutions intended to provide leverage in
good economic times and provide a buffer (i.e. loss
absorption) under stress scenarios when it would be
Notes
196 Preamble nr. 22 ATAD II.
197 Preamble, nr. 16 ATAD II.
198 See margin nr. 39.
199 See margin nrs. 41 ff.
200 See also Balco, supra n. 180, at 128.
201 This option to deduct and not include the same payment might under specific circumstances lead to the infringement of State aid rules. For example, the Dutch Government
announced ending the favourable tax treatment of CoCo securities. As from 1 Jan. 2019, the tax deductibility of the coupon paid on Additional Tier 1 capital instruments
has ended. According the Dutch Government ‘by abolishing the measure the state aid concerns by the European Commission will be met. The European Commission
intends to address concerns in all European Member States with comparable specific measures’. Government of the Netherlands, CoCos Not Tax Deductible Anymore as from 1
Jan. 2019 (29 June 2018), https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/06/29/cocos-not-tax-deductible-anymore-as-from-1-january-2019 (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
202 Preamble nr. 17, ATAD II. See EU Council, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries − General
Approach 36 (FISC) 2, (10 Feb. 2017), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6077-2017-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019) and EU Council, Proposal for a
Council Directive Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries (ATAD 2) − Explanation of Changes to Art. 9(4)(b) and (c), 230 (FISC) 2
(6 Dec. 2016), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15308-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
203 Art. 9, § 4, b) ATAD.
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difficult for them to raise capital. The rule targets the
banking sector204 in connection with consolidated
groups issuing such financial instruments for the pur-
poses of meeting loss-absorbing capacity requirements.
86. The carve-out rule is optional. Each Member
State decides whether or not the exclusion for
intra-group regulatory capital will be applicable.
Member States may continue to protect their tax
base through the use of the hybrid mismatch
rules. As this creates potential differences
between Member States, the uncertainty already
criticized under the OECD report is finally
maintained.
87. Given the controversy with regard to the
implementation, the exclusion may temporarily be
applied by Member States until 31 December 2022
and shall be evaluated by the European Commission
by 1 January 2022.
4.4 Mismatch in Tax Outcome: D/NI
Mismatch
88. The ATAD definitions of mismatches are in
accordance with BEPS Action 2. Hybrid mis-
matches under the ATAD will arise when a (part
of a) payment is made under a financial instru-
ment to the extent that the payment is deductible-
205 under the laws of the jurisdiction in which
that payment is treated as being made206 (the
payer jurisdiction) without a corresponding
inclusion207 for tax purposes in the jurisdiction
where that payment is received or is treated as
being received under the laws of any other juris-
diction (payee jurisdiction).208 This will result in a
D/NI outcome.
89. The directive acknowledges that jurisdic-
tions can employ different tax accounting periods
and have different rules for recognizing the
moment when items of income (particularly divi-
dend or interest) or expenditure have been
received or incurred. These timing differences
are not treated as giving rise to mismatches in
tax outcomes. Although the ATAD II preamble
allows States to require that a payment be
included within a fixed period of time,209
Article 2, §9, al. 2 ATAD not only states that a
payment should be ‘treated as included in income
within a reasonable period of time where the
payment is included by the jurisdiction of the
payee in a tax period that commences within
twelve months of the end of the payer’s tax
period’. It further continues that this will also
be the case if ‘it is reasonable to expect that the
payment will be included by the jurisdiction of
the payee in a future tax period and the terms of
payment are those that would be expected to be
agreed between independent enterprises’.
90. As the ‘payment’ must be recognized ‘within a
reasonable period of time’, it seems logical to assume
this ‘reasonable period of time’ for income inclusion
only begins after the payment of the remuneration
under the hybrid financial instrument.210 However,
Notes
204 At first, reference was made to the banking ‘and’ other regulated entities (e.g. insurance companies). See EU Council, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive (EU)
2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries − General Approach supra n. 203; EU Council, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164
as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries (ATAD 2) − Explanation of Changes to Art. 9(4)(b) and (c), supra n. 203. This was a compromise in order to find the right
balance between the need to cater for an exemption and the need to control its strict application.
205 According to Art. 2, §9, al. 3, d) ATAD the term ‘deduction’ means the amount i.e. treated as being deductible from the taxable income under the laws of the payer or
investor jurisdiction. The definition continues that the term ‘deductible’ shall be construed accordingly. However, it can be noticed that ‘deduction’ and ‘deductible’, in
general, are not amounts but properties of a particular cost.
206 Art. 2, §9 ATAD I initially only exploited differences in the tax treatment (of an instrument) under the laws of two or more Member States that resulted in a deduction of
the income in one Member State where the payment had its source without inclusion in the tax base of the other Member State. Based upon domestic law, multiple Member
States were considered as the ‘source State’. As the ATAD I did not explain how this requirement should be interpreted, it was difficult to establish in which country the
payment had its source. See Balco, supra n. 180, at 128. Under ATAD II, the ‘source of the payment’ is no longer used. Art. 2, §9 ATAD refers to ‘any jurisdiction in which
that payment is treated as made (payer jurisdiction)’. Unfortunately, this terminology might still lead to different interpretations.
207 According to Art. 2, §9, al. 3, e) ATAD, non-inclusion also encapsulates the situation in which the payment qualifies for double tax relief: if the character of the payment qualifies for
double tax relief under the laws of the payee jurisdiction, such as an exemption from tax, a reduction in the rate of tax or any credit or refund of tax (other than a credit for taxes withheld
at source), the payment should be treated as generating a hybrid mismatch to the extent of the resulting undertaxed amount.Art. 2, §9, al. 3, e) ATAD. The term ‘inclusion’means the
amount i.e. taken into account in the ‘taxable income’ under the laws of the payee jurisdiction. A payment under a financial instrument shall not be treated as being included to the
extent that the payment qualifies for any tax relief solely due to the way that payment is characterized under the laws of the payee jurisdiction.
208 See Art. 2, §9, al. 3, c) ATAD. The hybrid mismatch instrument rule in the ATAD I initially only exploited differences in the tax treatment (of an instrument) under the
laws of two or more Member States which resulted in a deduction of the income in one Member State (where the payment has its source) without inclusion in the tax base of
the other Member State. Based upon the domestic law, multiple Member States could be considered as the ‘source State’. As the ATAD I did not explain how this
requirement was interpreted, it was difficult to establish in which country the payment had its source. See also Balco, supra n. 180, at 128. Balco mentions that ‘Member
States could also take a restrictive approach to the question of whether a payment has its source in a Member State and taxpayers could circumvent the effect of the rules in
the Directive simply by making the payment through a taxable branch located in a third country.’
209 Preamble nr. 22 ATAD II.
210 See also Santos, supra n. 41, at 510–511. This understanding derives from the fact that interest expenses are usually deductible under a pro-rata method, i.e. pro rata temporis,
while dividends are only computed in the taxable income of the beneficiary on the approval of the dividend distribution by the general shareholder meeting.
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whereas the OECD report was criticized for its ambi-
guity, this vagueness has also been implemented in the
directive. Although the BEPS Action 2 Report pro-
vides some additional information, this rule could still
lead to different interpretations between Member
States. Ensuring a situation in which market partici-
pants have a fair and equal chance of succeeding and a
common standard for countering tax arbitrage with
third countries, however, requires this rule to be
applied as uniformly as possible. The remaining vague-
ness, therefore, must be deplored.
4.5 Neutralizing the Hybrid Financial
Mismatch
4.5.1 Particular Measures for the Tax Treatment of
Financial Instruments
91. The ATAD does not explicitly refer to
Recommendation 2.1. of the OECD BEPS Action 2
Report that limits the availability of a dividend exemp-
tion or equivalent tax relief for payments treated as being
deductible by the payer. Only when the P/S-directive is
applicable does Article 4, 1a obligate refusing an exemp-
tion and taxing the distributed income. As already illu-
strated in margin nr. 49, this recommendation only
seems to be effective in a rather bilateral context and
will probably not resolve a mismatch when additional
States are involved.211
92. Although the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report pro-
vides specific recommendations against the duplication
of tax credits under a hybrid transfer,212 the ATAD only
refers to the application of a general anti-abuse rule
consistent with Article 6 ATAD to prevent taxpayers
from exploiting the surplus credit to obtain a tax
advantage.213
4.5.2 Two-tiered Approach: Restricting the
Deduction of a Payment or Taxing the Income
93. Article 9, §2 ATAD I initially stated that ‘to the
extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction
without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall
deny the deduction of such payment’. As its initial scope
was limited to hybrid mismatches that arose (wholly)
within the European Union, there seemed to be no need
to adopt the defensive rule in the ATAD I.
94. With the extension of its scope to third-
country situations, the defensive rule also had to
be implemented to ensure the effectiveness of the
hybrid financial instruments mismatch rule.
Therefore, at present, Article 9, §2, b) ATAD
provides that ‘where the deduction is not denied
in the payer jurisdiction’, the Member State being
the payee jurisdiction must apply the defensive
rule and include the amount of the payment in
the taxable income214 of the beneficiary.
95. In addition, as previously mentioned, the
hybrid mismatch rules can be easily circumvented
by importing a mismatch outcome between two
(foreign) States into a third State (e.g. by financing
the creation of this mismatch conflict). Therefore,
according to Article 9, § 3 ATAD, ‘a Member
State shall deny a deduction for any payment by
a taxpayer to the extent that such payment
directly or indirectly funds deductible expenditure
giving rise to a hybrid mismatch [ … .] except to
the extent that one of the jurisdictions involved in
the transaction or series of transactions has made
an equivalent adjustment215 in respect of such
hybrid mismatch’. This adds the imported mis-
match rule as a third possible reaction.
96. In accordance with the OECD BEPS Action 2
Report, the linking rules only apply to payments
under the financial instrument and should not affect
the general features of a tax system no matter if it is
a classical or an imputation system.216 Furthermore,
as the two-tiered approach is based on the linking
rules of the OECD BEPS Action 2 Report, in gen-
eral, the same remarks made in the analyses of the
OECD hybrid financial instrument rule are, as such,
relevant. However, the binding effect of the directive
adds further complications.
97. The defensive rule provides an effective solu-
tion for a qualification conflict with a third State
not (or more restrictively) implementing the
Notes
211 Preamble nr. 23 ATAD II. It is remarkable to notice that also the first part of recommendation 2 (no longer providing for an exemption) has not been integrated into the
ATAD but is only partly reflected in Art. 4 P/S Directive.
212 See margin nr. 50.
213 Preamble nr. 23 ATAD II.
214 Although Art. 9, § 2 ATAD only refers to ‘inclusion in income’, it is noteworthy that, according to Art. 2, §9, al. 3, e) ATAD, ‘inclusion’ means the amount i.e. taken into
account in ‘the taxable income’ under the laws of the payee jurisdiction.
215 The equivalent adjustment that will be taken into account for the twelve months safe harbour period for considering tax period differences is uncertain.
216 Preamble nr. 9, ATAD II.
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primary rule.217 In addition, Article 9, §3 ATAD
provides a solution for an imported mismatch from
two other States that did not implement equivalent
adjustments. However, the secondary and third solu-
tion apply in general terms ‘when the other States
have no equivalent adjustments’. This raises the
question of what happens if an EU Member State
does not fulfil its obligations to fully implement the
ATAD or if a (complying) Member State provides
solutions already before the final deadline of 1
January 2020, the moment from which all Member
States should comply with the directive. Is the
defensive rule applicable when another EU Member
State does not apply the primary rule? Can the
imported mismatch rule apply to financed mis-
matches between other (non-complying) EU-
Member States?
If a Member State acting as a payer or payee
jurisdiction fails to implement the linking rules
in time, the European Commission has the author-
ity to initiate an infringement procedure against
this Member State. However, the infringement
procedure could take several years and incite
uncertainty for all concerned jurisdictions.
Additionally, infringement proceedings will not
resolve existing hybrid mismatches that arise
between Member States.218
Based on the general terminology of Article 9, §2,
b) ATAD (‘where the deduction is not denied in the
payer jurisdiction’) and Article 9, §3 ATAD (‘except
to the extent that one of the jurisdictions
involved … has made an equivalent adjustment’),
one might be inclined to conclude that the second-
ary/third solution becomes applicable. However,
according to preamble nr. 24 ATAD II, the defen-
sive rule was meant to ‘provide for a rule that allows
Member States to tackle discrepancies in the transposition
and implementation of this Directive resulting in a hybrid
mismatch despite the fact that Member States act in
compliance with this Directive. Where such a situation
arises and the primary rule provided for in this Directive
does not apply, a secondary rule should apply’. For all
other cases (when the payer jurisdiction is a Member
State), therefore, it can be considered reasonable to
conclude that Member States are not obligated to
implement the defensive rule in their domestic
legislation.219
If, however, domestic rules apply in accordance
with the OECD standards, this would still lead
towards the application of a defensive (or third)
solution when a State is confronted with other
non-complying States regardless of their status as
an EU-Member State or a third State. In itself, this
cannot be considered as violating the ATAD
outcome.
4.6 Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule and
Primary EU Law
98. According to its explanatory memorandum,
the ATAD establishes legally binding rules to
tackle corporate tax avoidance in a way that pre-
serves EU Member States’ collective competitiveness
and respects the Single Market, Treaty Freedoms,
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and EU
law in general.220 Being part of secondary EU Law,
the hybrid mismatch rules of Article 9 ATAD have
to respect the limitations imposed by EU primary
law. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the inter-
action between the ATAD and the EU fundamental
freedoms. This article, however, is not meant to
provide an extensive analysis but only indicates
the most important remarks that can be made
with regard to this question.221
Notes
217 In this context, however, Fibbe and Stevens mention that ‘implementing the defensive rule to all possible situations of non-appliance with the primarily rule seems almost an
impossible mission for the national legislators’. See Fibbe & Stevens, supra n. 162, at 162.
218 See also Balco, supra n. 180, at 128. According to Balco, the question for the application of the defensive (or third) solution can be raised if Member States take a restrictive
approach to the interpretation and implementation of the directive (particularly regarding identifying whether or not a particular mismatch is ‘attributable to differences in
the legal characterization of a financial instrument or entity’).
219 However, Fibbe and Stevens are of the opinion that a Member State (payee jurisdiction) should apply the defensive rule if another Member State (the payer jurisdiction) fails
to implement the primary rule. See Fibbe & Stevens, supra n. 162, at 162.
220 Cf. Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, Brussels, nr. 2016/001 3 (28
Jan. 2016)https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0026&from=EN (accessed 14 Oct. 2019).
221 For more details regarding this topic, cf. F. D. Martinez Laguna, Hybrid Financial Instruments, Double Non-taxation and Linking Rules 271 ff (Wolters Kluwer 2018); Santos,
supra n. 41, at 506–518; A. P. Dourado, The EU Free Movement of Capital and Third Countries: Recent Developments, 45(3) Intertax 192 ff (2017); A. P. Dourado, Free Movement of
Capital: The European Union Anti-Tax Avoidance Package and Brexit, 44(12) Intertax 872 (2017); P. B. Regil, BEPS Actions 2, 3 and 4 and the Fundamental Freedoms: Is There a
Way Out?, 56(6) Eur. Tax’n 230–245 (2016); J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 1, 53(11) Eur. Tax’n 442–456 (2013); J. Bundgaard,
Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 2, 53(11) Eur. Tax’n 587–594 (2013).
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99. In particular, Article 49 Treaty on the func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU) (freedom of
establishment) and 63 TFEU (free movement of
capital) appear to be at stake. However, as only the
free movement of capital also applies with regard to
third States, the distinction between both freedoms
should be carefully considered. This depends on
whether the rule applies with regard to sharehold-
ings that are only maintained as a financial invest-
ment without possibilities to influence the
management and/or control of a company or only
affects controlling participations. 222
100. It is nonetheless possible that both funda-
mental freedoms overlap with each other.223 The
purpose of the legislation that is concerned must
then be taken into consideration (as well as whether,
in the circumstances of the primary proceedings,224
one of those prevails over the other).225 The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) will challenge the
measure in dispute against only one of those two
freedoms if it appears from the circumstances of the
case that one freedom is entirely secondary in rela-
tionship to the other and may be considered together
with it.226 Nonetheless, in most cases involving
direct taxation, the ECJ seems to give precedence
to other freedoms over the free movement of
capital.227
101. Once the applicable freedom is determined, the
question arises as to whether the two tiered approach is
discriminatory or restricts free movement. Considering
the prerequisite of a mismatch, these rules only apply
between two different legal systems and, therefore,
require a cross border context. Whereas the primary
rule (rejecting a generally accepted deduction) clearly
restricts free movement, the question was raised as to
whether the defensive rule could also be seen to have
this detrimental effect. According to Regil, ‘it follows
that even though the defensive rule is liable to have a
detrimental effect in the majority of the situations in
which taxpayers enter into financial instruments with
non-residents, the fact that the defensive rule applies
precisely because there is no economic double taxation
when the profits were deductible at the level of the
payor makes the rule non-discriminatory’.228 It is pos-
sible, however, that the ECJ will examine the defensive
rule under a restriction approach. As the defensive rule
will only lead to the inclusion of the amount of the
payment in the income in a Member State due to the
fact that it is deductible in another jurisdiction, it
would be fairly clear to conclude that the measure
has a restrictive effect.
102. If one (or both) of the linking rules are con-
sidered to be restrictive (whether or not discrimina-
tory), possible justifications for this restriction might
be sought. An examination of the objectives of the
ATAD could particularly reveal the coherence of the
tax system, the balanced allocation of taxing rights,
and preventing tax avoidance. 229
Considerations relating to the coherence of the tax sys-
tem may only be relied upon when the taxpayer is one
and the same person, and there is a direct association
between the fiscal advantage granted to a taxpayer and
taxes due.230 As the hybrid financial instrument rule
does not relate to the taxation of one single taxpayer, it
seems unlikely that the linking rules will be justified
based on the ‘coherence of the tax system’. Additionally,
a justification based on the need to ‘preserve a balanced
allocation of taxing rights’ seems to be difficult to apply.
The ECJ stated, regarding the balanced allocation
between Member States of the power to tax, that a
justification is acceptable when a system is designed to
prevent conduct that is capable of undermining the
Notes
222 UK: ECJ, 13 Nov. 2012, Case C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs, ECLI:EU:
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223 See R. Barents & L. J. Brinckhorst, Grondlijnen van Europees recht, 664 (Kluwer, 2006).
224 However, in some cases, the ECJ has also moved away from the factual situation test and has combined the purpose of the law with the access to the market criterion. See
A. P. Dourado, The EU Free Movement of Capital and Third Countries: Recent Developments, supra n. 222, at 199.
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right of Member States to exercise their tax jurisdiction
in relationship to the activities conducted in their terri-
tory and thus jeopardizing a balanced allocation between
Member States of the power to impose taxes.231
However, as mentioned in margin nr. 2, the purpose of
linking rules is not to protect the tax base of a certain
Member State but to tackle the general outcome of
double non-taxation caused by hybrid mismatches.
Considering that the key objective of the ATAD is
to improve the resilience of the internal market
against tax avoidance risks arising from the manip-
ulation of hybrid mismatches, the prevention of tax
avoidance/tax abuse could be the most effective jus-
tification for restrictions on the fundamental free-
doms. In several cases, however, the ECJ stated
that rules aimed at preventing tax avoidance may
(only) be justified when they specifically target
‘purely artificial arrangements with the objective of
circumventing the relevant Member State’s
legislation’.232 Financial instruments are generally
not artificial as transactions with hybrid financial
instruments are not only carried out to obtain a tax
advantage. The tax advantage is merely a conse-
quence of a conflict in the characterization of the
instrument (and hence the tax treatment of the pay-
ments made under it).233 Additionally, the mere fact
that (corporate) taxpayers exploit an inconsistent
treatment does not necessarily mean that there is
avoidance behaviour.
Based on the above, it is acceptable to assume
that the objectives invoked by the ATAD, as such,
do not fully justify an impediment to the relevant
TFEU provisions.
103. Moreover, even if general justifications were
withheld, the proposed measures cannot go beyond
what is necessary to achieve these objectives.
The automatic nature and the broad scope of appli-
cation of the linking rules (‘any payment’ under a
hybrid financial instrument that results in double
non-taxation between related parties) can hardly be
considered as strictly proportional. The hybrid mis-
match rule does not provide the taxpayer with an
opportunity to substantiate that the transactions are
economically motivated or even purely for
commercial reasons (with a specific exception for
financial traders234). As such, the rules do not seem
to pass the proportionality-test.
104. In conclusion, the linking rules might be
considered as violating the EU free movement of
capital (and/or establishment). However, this short
descriptive chapter only raises the question and
some criticism without extensively concluding
this complex question. The final word is left for
the ECJ.
5 CONCLUSION
105. Over the last decade, several solutions have been
proposed to deal with hybrid financial instruments.
Unfortunately, both the OECD and the European
Council missed the opportunity to address the cause
of the hybrid mismatches. Apparently, it appears to be
impossible to implement a uniform tax treatment of
financial instruments while eliminating the possibility
for mismatches among different countries.
As an alternative to neutralize the effects of hybrid
financial instruments, countries will have to adopt a
single set of integrated linking rules that provide for
clear and transparent outcomes under the laws of all
of the jurisdictions applying the same rules.
Although not reaching harmonized treatment, the
linking rules nonetheless make the tax treatment of
a payment in one country dependent upon its treat-
ment in the country of the counterparty. This link-
ing hierarchy of solutions makes the application of
the rules very complicated.
106. The solutions proposed by the OECD leave
several ambiguities:
– Although meant to solve mismatches, the hybrid
financial instrument rule only envisages tax
reducing effects. A mismatch in tax outcomes
leading towards extensive taxation due to char-
acterization differences is disregarded.
– The mere outcome is considered to be abusive
whereas obtaining a benefit does not necessarily
reflect the intent of a concerned taxpayer to
actively avoid taxes.
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231 BE: ECJ, 5 July 2012, Case C-318/10, Societe d’investissement pour l’agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v. Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:2012:415, para. 45; Cadbury Schweppes plc,
Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (C-196/04), supra n. 223, para. 56, UK: ECJ, 13 Dec. 2005, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer v.
David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), ECLI:EU:C:2005:763, para. 46.
232 Test Claimants in the Thin CapGroup Litigatio, (C-524/04), supra n. 227, para. 57; Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury SchweppesOverseas Ltd v. Commissioners of InlandRevenue, (C-196/
04), supra n. 223, para. 51: Marks & Spencer v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), (C-446/03), supra n. 232, para. 57;, Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), supra n. 231, para. 37.
233 See margin nr. 6.
234 See margin nrs. 72–73.
Intertax
44
– The linking rules reduce tax benefits but will
not necessarily tax the income where the income
is earned or the value is created. It ultimately
does not matter where the income is taxed (i.e.
whether the tax is collected under the primary or
the defensive rule) as long as the income will be
taxed at least once.
Finally, the interaction between domestic tax systems
may still continue to generate tax loopholes. As such, e.
g. the hybrid financial instrument rule is not applicable
with respect to capital gains. Therefore, profits made
on disposals of shares could be beyond its scope.
Additionally, a payment to acquire a bond will not
generate a mismatch in tax outcomes under the hybrid
financial instrument rule (unless the contract to acquire
the instrument is treated as a financial instrument or a
hybrid transfer). Moreover, timing differences in char-
acterization and the need for cash flow may possibly
lead to tax arbitrage (or even tax avoidance). This could
be the case when an instrument is first treated as equity
but then is later reclassified retrospectively). The effec-
tiveness of the so-called anti-avoidance measure could
be limited and might subsequently mean that the
problem of double non-taxation is still present in
some cross-border cases.
107. With the publication of the ATAD II, the
ATAD hybrid mismatch rules are brought into
accordance with the OECD BEPS Action 2 recom-
mendations. However, as clear indications are
sometimes lacking, the preamble of the ATAD II
simply referred to ‘the applicable explanations and
examples in the OECD BEPS Action 2 report as a
source of illustration or interpretation to the
extent that they are consistent with the provisions
of this Directive and with Union law’.
However, as the general hybrid financial instruments
mismatch rule might inherently violate EU law, it is
not clear which parts of the report are consistent
with EU law. In our opinion, the mere reproduction
of linking rules proposed by the OECD BEPS Action
2 Report may restrict the free movement of capital
and the freedom of establishment. It is unlikely that
this restriction will fully pass the rule of reason as
being applied by the ECJ.
108. This article aimed at comparing the EU
implementation of the hybrid financial instrument
mismatch rule with its OECD source. Whereas
already minimal differences exist between the
OECD proposal and the European Directive, larger
differences will arise regarding the implementation
of these rules in domestic tax law. Considering the
high complexity, it remains rather doubtful whether
all EU Member States will be able to correctly and
consistently implement these rules in 2020.
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